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Francisco de Vitoria’s Normative Ideas and
the Beginnings of International Law: A
Colonial Ethnocentric Discourse, or a Bona
Fide Effort to Construct Just International
Norms?
BY YURI G. MANTILLA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fragmentation of international law, its legal positivist foundation, and the influence of critical approaches in its deconstruction has
shaped debates about international law’s present and future. To properly
understand prevalent international normative ideas and to think about potential improvements in constructing a just normative international order,
it is essential to analyze the genealogy of the ideas that created international law. This article focuses on the origins of international law in the
16th century normative ideas of Francisco de Vitoria and his proposal to
apply them to the inter-civilizational relations between indigenous nations of the New World and European States. Considering the importance
of inter-civilizational relations in the 21st century and the increasing
recognition of indigenous peoples as important international actors, the
analysis of these ideas is of special importance.1
Beginning in the 1910s, Spanish authors including Vicente Beltrán
de Heredia, Luis Alonso Getino, Venancio Diego Carro, and Teófilo

* Yuri Mantilla is Professor of Law at Liberty University School of Law. Professor Mantilla holds
a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, an LL.M. degree from American
University Washington College of Law, an LL.B. equivalent, from Taras Shevchenko University
of Kiev, Ukraine. He has done undergraduate studies at the University of San Andres School of
Law in La Paz, Bolivia. He was awarded a Graduate Certificate in International Relations by Harvard University Extension School.
1. This writing is the law review article version of my Ph.D. thesis. See Yuri G. Mantilla,
Francisco de Vitoria, the Spanish Scholastic Perspective on Law, and the Conquest of the Inca
Empire: Universal Justice or Ethnocentric Colonialism (Jan. 25, 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Aberdeen) (on file with author).

43

FINAL_FOR_JCI

44

8/3/21 4:47 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 44:1

Urdanoz, systematically promoted the view that Francisco de Vitoria was
the founder of international law.2 They believed that Vitoria’s international legal ideas were consistent with principles of international justice
and could legitimately apply to the relations between nations from diverse
civilizations.3 In English-speaking countries, James Brown Scott, a leading scholar on Vitoria’s ideas, also promoted this perspective.4 In the
1990s, contrary to the traditional interpretation of Vitoria’s ideas, a perspective emerged that indicated that he was the founder of a colonial,
ethnocentric, and unjust discourse of international law.5 From that viewpoint, international law was established to justify the Spanish conquest
and colonization of the New World.6 In 1996, Antony Anghie published
his article entitled Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law.7 Anghie’s interpretation is one of the most influential
sources on Vitoria’s doctrines as a colonial ethnocentric international
normative discourse. Well recognized international legal scholars including Antony Anghie, Bret Bowden, and Richard Williams, also believe
that Vitoria’s law of nations’ doctrines articulate an unjust ethnocentric
discourse that has greatly influenced the discipline of international law.8
II. THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE
In the 21st century, there is an increasing influence of political ideas
that are challenging processes of global economic integration. These
views also question the contributions of international law in sustaining a
peaceful international order.9 They contest the contributions of international law in effectively addressing issues of international trade relations,
international human rights, and the protection of the environment and
others. Besides the nationalist populist critique of international law, there
2. Id. at 67-69; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
58-63 (1950).
3. See Mantilla, supra note 1, at 67-69.
4. See generally JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS (1934).
5. Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 326 (1996); see also Mantilla, supra note 1, at 36.
6. Anghie, supra note 5, at 326; see also Mantilla, supra note 1, at 36.
7. Anghie, supra note 5, at 321.
8. See Pablo Zapatero, Legal Imagination in Vitoria. The Power of Ideas, 11 J. HIST. INT’L
L. 221, 268-71 (2009) (describing the nature of the critical analysis of Vitoria’s ideas regarding
international law).
9. See Anne M. Orford, International Law and the Populist Moment: A Comment on Martti
Koskenniemi's Enchanted By the Tools? International Law and Enlightenment, 35 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. (2020).
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is an influential perspective that sustains the view that international law
is an inherently biased unjust system because of its colonial origins.10 This
point of view is based on strong criticisms of the writings of Francisco de
Vitoria, who is considered one of the founders of the discipline of international law.11
In the Spanish 16th century setting, there were efforts to recognize
the existence of normative ideas that could justly, and universally apply
to all civilizations.12 Regarding the 16th century view of universality and
its relation to natural law, Georg Cavallar said: “[t]he core idea of natural
law cosmopolitanism is that natural law is universal and should therefore
not be limited in scope, that is, it should be applied to all human beings.”13
In the Spanish 16th century historical context, there were two influential
schools of thought regarding the universality of the law of nations. The
first one, represented by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, indicated that the natural law of nations did not apply to indigenous nations because they were
less than human.14 The other view, represented by Bartolomé de las
Casas, indicated that the natural law of nations applied to all nations including indigenous ones.15
Georg Cavallar defines intellectual cosmopolitanism as: “a way of
thinking, a cognitive orientation with the key feature of impartiality.”16 In
the historical context of the 16th century, the concept of impartiality was
expressed in the concept of universal justice, which was understood as
what was owed to each person and nation.17 In the 16th century, Priest
Montesinos, a Spanish missionary in the New World, was one of the first
to articulate a universal perspective against the conquest of the New
World.18 Montesinos believed that the Spanish actions in indigenous territories were against principles of universal justice in the New World because they violated the human dignity of indigenous people.19 Montesinos

10. Mantilla, supra note 1, at 27, 143-44.
11. Id. at 142-44.
12. See LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA
17-23 (1965); see also Mantilla, supra note 1, at 30-32.
13. See Georg Cavallar, Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolf and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans, 10 J. HIST. INT’L L. 181, 185 (2008).
14. See JUAN GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, TRATADO SOBRE LAS JUSTAS CAUSAS DE LA GUERRA
CONTRA LOS INDIOS 12 (Fondo De Cultura Económica 3d ed., Manuel García Pelayo trans., 1996).
15. See generally BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, 1 TRATADOS 21-23 (Juan Pérez ed., Carlos
Millares & Rafael Moreno trans., 2d ed. 1997).
16. Cavallar, supra note 13, at 185.
17. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, LA JUSTICIA 20-21 (Luis Frayle Delgado trans., 2001).
18. See HANKE, supra note 12, at 17-19.
19. Id. at 17-22.
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also believed that it was as important to defend the interests of indigenous
nations as it was to defend the interests of his own country, Spain.20
Similarly, Bartolomé de las Casas, like Montesinos, believed that
the Spanish conquest of indigenous nations was contrary to principles of
universal justice. This was because it was contrary to the interests of indigenous people.21 Bartolomé de las Casas rejected Spanish legal justifications for the conquest and colonization of the New World. His ideas
were an effort to transcend Spain’s 16th century national interests and
embrace a universal perspective which considered the wellbeing of indigenous civilizations. That view was based on the belief in the existence of
one universal human nature and the equality of all human beings, because
they were created in God’s image.
Contrary to De las Casas’ view of universality, Juan Ginés de
Sepúlveda believed that it was in the best interest of Spain and humankind
to impose Spanish colonial rule to “ethnically inferior” indigenous people. In this case, the interests of indigenous nations were irrelevant because they were not considered to be members of humankind. Based on
that view, Sepúlveda defended Spanish colonial policies, which he considered to be consistent with universal justice. Sepúlveda’s perspective
on universal norms was based on the anthropological presupposition of
the ethnic inferiority of indigenous people.22 That type of ethnocentric
understanding of the natural law of nations was used to impose the interests of one society and one ethnic group, as if they were universal to others.
The main difference between 16th century Spanish views of universal justice is that one view considered not only the interests of Spain, but
also the interests of indigenous people, while the other view equated universal justice with Spanish national interests. For authors such as
Sepúlveda, Spain was the nation that represented universal European values against “infidel” and “sub-human” cultures such as those of the indigenous people of the New World.23
If Francisco de Vitoria tried to transcend his own intellectual and
cultural traditions, and the interests of his country, then his ideas could
be considered an endeavour to seek internationally just results. But in the
16th century historical context, Vitoria’s ideas could have been considered just and universal if he considered the interests not only of his own
country, but also the interests of indigenous nations.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 17-23.
See DE LAS CASAS, supra note 15, at 19-23.
See GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 12.
See generally id. at 109-13.
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Moreover, in the 16th century historical context, the concept of universal justice was closely related to the doctrine of human nature. If there
was a universal human nature, then the norms of the natural law of nations
could have been equally applied to Spain and the indigenous nations of
the New World. If there were diverse human natures, and the indigenous
nations of the New World were inherently inferior and sub-human, then
those norms could not have been equally applied to nations from diverse
civilizations.
The most important and original aspect of Vitoria’s writings are
found in his relecciones, in which he addressed topics of key theoretical
and practical importance for the Spanish 16th century context. Once a
year, as part of the academic system at the University of Salamanca, professors were required to lecture for the entire campus. These were known
as relecciones (re-readings) which were conferences on topics of special
importance. The relecciones are the main source of Vitoria’s doctrines on
the law of nations and the conquest of indigenous political communities.
Vitoria had fifteen relecciones, thirteen of which were published based
on notes taken by his students.24
In his writings on the law of nations and colonialism, Vitoria mentioned three concrete historical events regarding the Spanish conquest of
the New World. First, in his letter to Father Arcos (1534) he addressed
the issue of the conquest of the Inca Empire.25 This document is one of
the most important sources on Vitoria’s views on law and colonialism. In
that letter, Vitoria condemned the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire
and the Spanish actions in the massacre of Cajamarca. Second, in De temperatia, he addressed the issue of cannibalism and human sacrifice practised in the Aztec realm in the Yucatan peninsula. Third, in his writing on
De indis, he mentioned the Spanish alliances with minority indigenous
groups as a just cause for war.
Vitoria’s international jurisprudential doctrines on the laws applicable to the relations between nations of diverse civilizations should be
evaluated by considering philosophical, theological, and anthropological
presuppositions which influenced his legal doctrines. Regarding the concept of doctrine, Professor Anthony Carty writes:
An essential element of doctrine is that it is supposed to have
authority. The theory, opinion, etc. must be capable of exercising influence. Coming from the tradition of Roman law and
24. See LUIS G. ALONSO GETINO, 1 RELECCIONES TEOLÓGICAS DEL MAESTRO FRAY
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA viii-ix (1933) (analyzing Vitoria’s lectures).
25. Francisco de Vitoria, Letter to Miguel Arcos, OP Salamanca, 8 November (1534), in 1
POLITICAL WRITINGS 331-33 (Jeremy Lawrence & Anthony Pagden eds., 12th prtg. 2010).
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canon law, particularly in French and German legal communities, doctrine has authority not as a source of law as such, but as
freely and spontaneously held opinion, which is likely to become accepted.26
In the 16th century, when Spain conquered the Inca and other indigenous nations of the New World, there was not an international system of
positive law applicable to the international relations between Spain and
the nations of the New World. To find out the nature of Vitoria’s international normative doctrines, it is necessary to consider diverse systems of
law that applied to nations from diverse civilizations and its mutual relations in the 16th century historical context. It is important to analyze Vitoria’s ideas not only on the law of nations, but also on Spanish colonial
laws, which were applied to indigenous nations, and on natural law which
was applicable to all human beings.
Francisco de Vitoria’s normative ideas, which influenced the Spanish scholastic perspective on law, were shaped by his philosophical, theological, and anthropological views of the Inca and other indigenous nations. The facts about the history of the Andean and other indigenous
civilizations were gathered by Spanish historians who were witnesses of
the Spanish conquest of the New World.27 The historical writings of Spanish authors were the source of information that shaped the normative doctrines of Vitoria and other Spanish scholastic thinkers on indigenous nations.28
In analyzing the normative relations between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New World, Francisco de Vitoria highlights the key

26. ANTHONY CARTY, PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2007).
27. Authors such as Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Fray Gerónimo de Mendieta, Fray Diego
de Duran, Bernabé Cobo, Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, and other Spanish historians wrote about
the Inca and Aztec empires from a biased perspective. Despite this, their works are fundamental
sources for the study of the Inca and Aztec societies. See generally JUAN DE BETANZOS, SUMA Y
NARRACIÓN DE LOS INCAS (1968); BERNABE COBO, HISTORY OF THE INCA EMPIRE: AN ACCOUNT
OF THE INDIANS’ CUSTOMS AND THEIR ORIGIN, TOGETHER WITH A TREATISE ON INCA LEGENDS,
HISTORY, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Roland Hamilton trans., Univ. of Texas Press rev. ed. 1979);
BERNARDINO DE SAHAGUN, FLORENTINE CODEX: INTRODUCTIONS AND INDICES (Arthur J.O. Anderson & Charles Dibble trans., Univ. of Utah Press 1982); JOSE DE ACOSTA, HISTORIA NATURAL
Y MORAL DE LAS INDIAS (1986); FRAY GERÓNIMO DE MENDIETA, HISTORIA ECLESIASTICA
INDIANA II (2002); PEDRO SARMIENTO DE GAMBOA, THE HISTORY OF THE INCAS (Brian S. Bauer
& Vania Smith trans., Univ. of Texas Press 2007).
28. See Arnoldo Mora Rodriguez, La Identidad Latinoamericana: Enfoque Filosofico, 14
REVISTA COMUNICACION, Aug.-Dec. 2005, at 27, 29. Professor Mora provides an excellent analysis of the contributions of Spanish historians and philosophers to the formation of the Latin American ideas.
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importance of theology as the source of all other areas of knowledge.29
Theology had a direct influence in his doctrines on the law of nations and
natural law.30 Vitoria believed in the existence of universal objective
norms applicable to all human beings and nations. He was concerned with
the renewal of the image of God (imago Dei), of human beings, and the
eternal implications of the extreme violent actions of Spanish conquerors
and indigenous nations in the New World.
III. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL
CONTEXT
On October 4, 1483, Francisco de Vitoria was born in the city of
Burgos, Castile, Spain.31 He became one of the most influential authors
in the history of international law. Vitoria, together with Hugo Grotius
and Alberico Gentili, is considered one of the founders of international
law.32 In 1526, Vitoria became a professor of theology at the University
of Salamanca and taught there until he died in 1546.33 He replaced the
Sentences of Peter Lombard for Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae as
the main text for the study of theology.34 In his lectures, he applied general theological principles to concrete and important issues of his time
such as the Spanish conquest of the indigenous nations of the New World.
As a result of these lectures, Vitoria developed original ideas about the
Spanish conquest and colonization of the New World. His views on the
law of nations were expressed in his lectures titled De indis, De iure belli,
and De temperatia, among others.
To assess Vitoria’s ideas, it is important to consider the specific historical context which influenced his thinking. His ideas were those of a

29. See, e.g., VICENTE BELTRAN DE HEREDIA, LOS MANUSCRITOS DEL MAESTRO FRAY
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA (1928) (demonstrating the prevalence of theology in Vitoria’s legal doctrines).
30. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 3, 10, 40. For example, regarding the doubt about
the justice of the conquest of the New World, he wrote:
It is not the province of lawyers, or not of lawyers alone, to pass sentence in this question. Since these barbarians we speak of are not subjects [of the Spanish Crown] by
human law (iure humano), as I shall show in a moment their affairs cannot be judged
by human statutes (leges humanae), but only by divine ones, in which jurists are not
sufficiently versed to form an opinion on their own.
Id. at 238.
31. See, e.g., RAMÓN HERNÁNDEZ MARTIN, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA: VIDA Y PENSAMIENTO
INTERNACIONALISTA 17 (1995).
32. See, e.g., ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 58 (1950).
33. JUAN BELDA PLANS, LA ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA Y LA RENOVACION DE LA TEOLOGIA
EN EL SIGLO XVI 326 (2000).
34. Id. at 328.
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Spanish Catholic theologian who lived in the 16th century.35 Thus, Vitoria wrote about the conquest of the New World and the laws applicable
to nations as a reaction to the Spanish conquest of the Inca realm. To find
out if Vitoria’s international normative ideas were inherently unjust, or if
they provided a beginning for just norms applicable to international relations between different civilizations, it is essential to understand Vitoria’s
views of concrete indigenous nations such as the Inca.
If Vitoria made a bona fide effort to transcend his cultural settings
and proposed ideas which could have benefited the interests of indigenous nations, then his ideas could have been internationally just in the
16th century Spanish context. If his ideas were a normative discourse to
justify the Spanish conquest and colonization of indigenous nations under
a false claim of international justice, then he was one of the main contributors to the establishment of a biased, unjust, and ethnocentric international law.
To answer the question regarding the nature of Vitoria’s international normative ideas, it is important to attempt to understand his views
as they were understood in the 16th century Spanish historical context.36
Consistent with Professor Quentin Skinner’s view of history, it can be
noted that Spanish scholastic thinkers, including Vitoria, were focused on
certain issues that were specific to their historical and ideological context.37 To interpret the facts of the Spanish conquest of the New World,
Vitoria used theological and philosophical concepts which were meaningful to his 16th century Spanish audience. Vitoria’s audience believed
in a Christian/Catholic worldview of reality. These theological and philosophical concepts became the basis of Vitoria’s normative ideas on the
laws applicable to nations from diverse civilisations.
Here, applying Quentin Skinner’s historical approach in this article,
the justice of Vitoria’s and other Spanish scholastic thinkers’ ideas should
be measured consistently with 16th century views.38 In regards to the importance of analyzing ideas consistently with the intellectual context in
which they were written, Skinner writes:
I am only pleading for the historical task to be conceived as that
of trying so far as possible to think as our ancestors thought and
to see things their way. What this requires is that we should recover the concepts they possessed, the distinctions they drew
35. See generally 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 3 (2002)
(explaining the importance of historical context).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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and the chains of reasoning they followed in their attempts to
make sense of their world.39
The nature and intentions of Vitoria’s writings can be interpreted by
understanding his audience. Vitoria communicated to an audience of 16th
century Spanish government officials, professors, and church leaders.
Therefore, to comprehend his ideas, it is essential to know the legal, theological, and philosophical languages which had a rational meaning for
his 16th century European audience. As a professor and friar, he often
interacted in the Spanish cities of Valladolid and Salamanca with former
catholic missionaries and former Spanish conquerors. In their dialogues
with Vitoria, they wanted to appease their consciences and receive forgiveness for their crimes to ensure their eternal salvation.40
Historical facts about the indigenous nations of the New World,
which Vitoria knew or should have known, are essential to understanding
the nature of Vitoria’s international normative ideas.41 Vitoria specifically
only mentioned the conquest of the Inca Empire, the indigenous nations’
practice of human sacrifice in Yucatan, and the Spanish alliances with the
Tlaxcala, a minority indigenous group. The consideration of these facts
helps understand the implications of Vitoria’s international normative
ideas for the relations between civilizations. It also helps answer the question of the application of norms, which emerged in one civilization, to the
international relations between diverse civilizations.
Vitoria believed that one of the first widespread violations of natural
law and the law of nations during the invasion of the Inca realm occurred
in the city of Cajamarca. In a letter written on November 8, 1534, to his
friend Miguel de Arcos, Vitoria expressed his rejection of Francisco Pizarro and other Spanish conquerors’ violent actions against the Inca people in the city of Cajamarca.42 This was the beginning of his intellectual
task to develop a discourse on the laws applicable to Spain’s international
relations with the indigenous nations of the New World.
Vitoria’s letter to Father Arcos shows the critical importance of the
concept of human nature in Vitoria’s view of the conquest of the Inca
39. Id. at 47.
40. LUCIANO PEREÑA, LA ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA, PROCESO A LA CONQUISTA DE
AMERICA 19-22 (1986); see also FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS O LIBERTAD DE LOS
INDIOS XXXI-XLI (Luciano Pereña & Jose M. Pérez Prendes eds., 1967).
41. See HORACIO ZAPATER, AMERICA LATINA: ENSAYOS DE ETNOHISTORIA 71-91 (Marcelo
Rojas Vasquez ed. 2007) (explaining and analyzing historical facts regarding the Aztec and Inca
civilizations during the 1519-1621 period).
42. See ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA, CARTA MAGNA DE LOS INDIOS: FUENTES
CONSTITUCIONALES 1534-1609, at 35-40 (Luciano Pereña & Carlos Baciero eds., Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 1988).
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Empire. Vitoria’s view of human nature is a central aspect of his theological and philosophical doctrines, which served as the foundation for his
ideas on political communities and the laws applicable to nations from
diverse civilizations. For Vitoria, if indigenous people were sub-human,
then they could not violate the laws applicable to human beings.43 However, if they were fully human, then natural law applied to them and their
human dignity should have been respected.44 Vitoria’s letter entails a
strong criticism of the Spanish conquerors’ actions in the Inca realm. The
Spanish wars in the Andean region were contrary to Francisco de Vitoria’s scholastic perspective on the laws applicable to nations; Vitoria had
reasonable doubt about the legality of the conquest of the New World.45
This perspective was contrary to the Spanish government’s colonial policy, which was justified by normative instruments such as the Requerimiento, Alexandrian Papal Bulls, and Capitulation of Toledo.
IV. VITORIA’S REJECTION OF SPANISH COLONIAL LAW DOCTRINES AND
THE CONQUEST OF THE INCA EMPIRE
In the 16th century context, prevalent European medieval normative
doctrines were applied to justify the conquest of indigenous people’s nations, which also included the Inca. The legal ideas reflected in the Alexandrian Papal Bulls, Requerimiento, and the Capitulations of Toledo
served as a normative discourse to justify the Spanish conquest of the
New World. Vitoria criticized the doctrinal foundations of these legal instruments. Also, Vitoria’s rejection of the Requerimiento was especially
relevant concerning the conquest of the Inca Empire, since this document
was the main legal foundation for the Spanish conquest and unjust use of
force in the Andean Region.
Along with its political and military powers, Spain also used its laws
to justify its conquest and subsequent colonization of overseas territories.
The Spanish laws used to justify Spain’s conquests in the New World
reflected the influence of theological and philosophical presuppositions
about the nature of indigenous people and political authority. The Alexandrian Papal Bulls, Requerimiento, and Capitulations were based on
the doctrine of the Pope’s universal authority on earthly matters and the

43. Id. at 39.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 37.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2021]

8/3/21 4:47 PM

Francisco de Vitoria on the Origins of International Law

53

view of indigenous people as ethnically inferior and in need of Spanish
protection.46
The doctrine of universal papal authority, on spiritual and earthly
matters, served as one of the main foundations for the creation of norms
applicable to the international relations of Spain with indigenous nations
of the New World. The laws, which justified the Spanish actions for the
conquest and colonization of the New World, were also based on theological and philosophical presuppositions on human nature and political
authority. One of the main presuppositions of normative colonial Spanish
instruments was the inherent superiority of Spain’s political authority
over indigenous nations.47
In 16th century Spain, Jews, Muslims, Incas, and other non-Christian people were considered infidels.48 Unlike Muslim and Jewish people,
the Incas never lived in Christian territories, did not know about Christianity, and never took over European territories. Nonetheless, normative
instruments such as the Requerimiento, Alexandrian Papal Bulls, and Capitulations were based on similar theological and philosophical presuppositions as the ones used in the normative doctrines, which justified the
use of force against Jews and Muslims by European nations.49
After the success of Christopher Columbus in “discovering” new
territories, the Spanish Crown decided to expand its geopolitical influence in the New World.50 For this expansion, Spain used normative justifications such as the papal bulls. One of the presuppositions reflected in
the papal bulls was the right of Christian kings to take over territories that
did not belong to other Christian nations. This was known as the “right
of discovery” which was based on Roman law concepts.51
The Inter caetera divinai was one of the main papal bulls used by
Spain to justify the conquest of the New World. This normative instrument recognized Spain’s victory against Muslims who occupied Christian Spanish territories in Granada.52 Because of this recognition, Spain
was rewarded with the authority to conquer the territories of “infidel”

46. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 55-56 (1991).
47. See, e.g., SILVIO ZAVALA, LA FILOSOFÍA POLÍTICA EN LA CONQUISTA DE AMÉRICA 50
(3d ed. 1984).
48. See JAMES MULDOON, POPES, LAWYERS AND INFIDELS 45-48 (1979).
49. Id. at 141.
50. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 81 (1990).
51. Id. at 99.
52. Id. at 80.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

54

8/3/21 4:47 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 44:1

nations in the New World.53 From the Inca’s perspective, as an indigenous
people, Spain was a mysterious foreign authority from an unfamiliar
place, and granted their territory and other indigenous peoples’ territories
to an unknown king. These unjust actions were done to change the Inca
culture, and military force was used to diminish the indigenous population.54
The papal bull Inter caetera divinae indicated the pope had an apostolic power, which was initially given by Jesus Christ to the Apostle
Peter. It also asserted that the pope granted jurisdiction over the New
World to the Spanish Crown. The papal bulls’ coercive force was based
on the threat of excommunication for Christian rulers who violated their
provisions.55 Additionally, the Capitulations of Santa Fe was an important normative instrument for the relations between Spain and the New
World. In 1491, Christopher Columbus made a request to King Ferdinand
and Queen Isabella to support his efforts to travel and discover a new
route to Asia.56 Historian Lyle McAlister writes: “[I]n April 1492 Isabella
and Ferdinand gave a patent to Columbus known as the Capitulations de
Santa Fe . . . [i]n return for his enterprise, the Catholic Kings appointed
him viceroy, admiral, and governor in all the lands he might discover
. . . .”57
Capitulations were agreements between the Spanish Crown and
conquerors of the New World on issues of jurisdiction, finances, and others.58 Through these capitulations, the Spanish Crown both regulated
Spanish citizens actions in indigenous territories, and also granted them
discovery, conquest, and settlement authority.59 The main normative instrument that gave jurisdiction and authority to Francisco Pizarro to conquer and colonize the Inca Empire was the Capitulation of Toledo. On
July 26, 1529, in the city of Toledo, Spain, Queen Isabella and the Supreme Council of Indies signed the Capitulation of Toledo.60 The
53. Id.
54. MIGUEL LEON PORTILLA, EL REVERSO DE LA CONQUISTA: RELACIONES MEXICAS,
MAYAS E INCAS 120, 133 (Joaquin Moritz ed., 2007) (explaining indigenous perspectives on the
Spanish conquest of the New World).
55. CARNEGIE INST. OF WASH., EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES to 1648, at 63 (Frances G. Davenport ed., 1917).
56. LYLE N. MCALISTER, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN THE NEW WORLD 1492-1700, at 69 (2nd
ed. 1987).
57. Id.
58. See CARLOS DEUSTUA PIMENTEL, ENSAYOS SOBRE LAS INSTITUCIONES JURÍDICAS DEL
VIRREINATO DEL PERÚ 32-37 (Carlos Deustua Landazuri ed., 2007).
59. Id.
60. See José Antonio del Busto, Conquista y Virreinato, in ENCICLOPEDIA TEMÁTICA DEL
PERÚ 28 (2004).
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Capitulation of Toledo recognized Francisco Pizarro as governor and
general Captain of Peru, and it also granted him the authority and jurisdiction to conquer and colonize the Inca Empire. Supposedly, the Castilian Crown had the authority to grant jurisdiction to Pizarro over the Incan
realm because the Pope granted the Spanish Crown jurisdiction over the
New World in the Alexandrian Papal Bulls. Regarding the Capitulation
of Toledo, Jose Antonio del Busto writes:
On the 26th of July, 1529, the Capitulation of Toledo was signed
in the city of Toledo, Castile, the New. In this document, the
Crown, nominally represented by the empress Isabel . . . and the
counsellors of the Royal and Supreme Council of Indies, named
Francisco Pizarro governor, captain general, and main bailiff of
Peru.61
The Capitulation of Toledo granted Pizzaro the authority to create
an army, acquire horses for war, grant repartimientos (distributions of
indigenous persons), distribute gold, and evangelise indigenous people.62
The Capitulation of Toledo also describes Pizarro’s merits and mentions
he discovered Peru and the city of Tumbes. Additionally, it asserts that
Pizarro used his own finances in those expeditions.63 In general, the Capitulation of Toledo authorized Pizarro to continue the discovery, conquest, and colonization of Peru.64
The norms of the Capitulation of Toledo clearly established the
Spanish Crown’s responsibility in the conquest and colonization of the
Incan realm. The Capitulation of Toledo was based on the doctrinal understanding of the universal jurisdiction of the Pope who could grant the
territories of the New World to the king of Spain. Therefore, the Spanish
Crown had the authority to grant indigenous territories to its citizens.
Father Montesinos, a Dominican missionary, spoke against the unjust treatment of the indigenous people of the New World and defended
their human dignity.65 As a reaction to reform movements, such as the
one led by Montesinos, the Spanish Crown decided to “humanize” its
treatment of indigenous people in the New World by promulgating the
61. Id.
62. Id. at 28-29.
63. See PIMENTEL, supra note 58, at 69.
64. ANTONIA MARIA FABIE, Capitulación y Asiento Celebrados con Francisco Pizarro para
la Conquista y Población de las Provincias del Perú, Donde se Contienen Varias Disposiciones
para el Buen Gobierno e Ellas, in 9 COLECCIÓN DE DOCUMENTOS INÉDITOS RELATIVOS AL
DESCUBRIMIENTO, CONQUISTA Y ORGANIZACIÓN DE LAS ANTIGUAS POSESIONES ESPAÑOLAS DE
ULTRAMAR 2, at 407, 409-10 (1895).
65. See LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA
18 (1965).
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Laws of Burgos (1512-1523).66 In describing those laws, Salord Bertrán
writes:
In those laws, the Crown recognized its obligation to govern the
Indians consistent with natural law and ethics. Although some
historians consider that because it did not prohibit the “encomienda” (the control of land and indigenous persons by colonists), it did not establish an authentic foundation in favour of
the rights of the Indians.67
The Laws of Burgos were promulgated considering the situation on
the island of Española and expanded to Puerto Rico and Jamaica. These
laws were also valid during the conquest of the Inca realm. Despite the
existence of some just norms in the Laws of Burgos, there were also unjust ones, such as the Requerimiento. In regards to the Requerimiento,
Lyle McAlister writes:
This instrument summarized the genesis of just title . . . and
called on the Indians to acknowledge the pope as ruler of the
world and, in his stead, the king of Castile by virtue of donation.
It then informed them that if they accepted the summons they
would be received as loyal vassals, but if they did not, they
would be deprived of their liberty and property . . . .68
The Requerimiento was one of the main normative instruments used
to justify the conquest of the Inca Empire. The Requerimiento was based
on the concept of the unity of humankind as part of God’s creation,69 and
explained that from this common origin, the world was divided into diverse kingdoms.70 According to it, “[f]rom all the people, God, our Lord,
gave authority to one, who was named St Peter, to be the lord and superior
over all human beings of the world and whom all should obey . . . .”71
This means that according to the Requerimiento, St. Peter was granted all
of the kingdoms and jurisdictions of the world and authority over people
of all beliefs, including Christians, Jews, and Muslims among others. He
was also named Pope, which meant that he was the governor of all human
beings. This authority was also given to the successors of St. Peter, the
subsequent Popes.
66. See MANUEL SALORD BERTRÁN, LA INFLUENCIA DE FRANCISCO DE VITORIA EN EL
DERECHO INDIANO 106 (2002).
67. Id. at 106-07.
68. MCALISTER, supra note 56, at 90.
69. See Diego de Encinas, Provisión que se Manda al Marques Don Francisco Pizarro para
que Pudiese Continuar las Conquistas de las Provincias del Perú, in DE BELLO CONTRA
INSULANOS INTERVENCIÓN DE ESPAÑA EN AMÉRICA 538-39 (Luciano Pereña ed., 1982).
70. Id. at 539.
71. Id.
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The Requerimiento explains that the papal authority continues until
the present.72 The Requerimiento was used, by Spanish conquerors, to
justify their authority over indigenous territories. According to it: “[o]ne
of the last popes, who succeeded him [St Peter] . . . as lord of the world
donated this Islands and lands . . . to the said King and Queen and their
successors in this kingdom with all that exists in them . . . .”73 The Requerimiento demanded that indigenous nations recognise the universal
authority of the pope and European emperor.74 The Spanish conquerors
wanted indigenous nations to recognize Spain’s sovereignty over the
New World. If indigenous nations rejected the Requerimiento, they
would suffer the following consequences:
With God’s help, we will powerfully attack you and we will
make war everywhere and in all possible manners. We will subjugate you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and our
Highnesses. We will take you, your women, and your children,
and we will make you slaves . . . We will also take your properties . . . The deaths and damages which will happen . . . will be
your fault and not the fault of our Highnesses, ours or of the
people who came with us.75
As part of the Spanish strategy for the conquest of the Inca Empire,
Fray Vicente de Valverde, in the Inca city of Cajamarca, explained
(through his interpreter Martinillo de Poechos) the medieval Spanish legal colonial discourse of the Requerimiento to the Incan King Atahualpa.76 Valverde said that Atahualpa had to accept Christianity and the
universal jurisdiction of the pope and the emperor. If Atahualpa rejected
the Requerimiento, the Spaniards could use force against him. King Atahualpa rejected the conqueror’s demands. This gave the conquerors the
normative excuse they needed to use force against the Incan king and his
people.77 Vitoria rejects the normative foundations of the Requerimiento
and condemns the massacre of Cajamarca, which was the beginning of
the conquest of the Inca Empire.
A comparative analysis between the text of the Requerimiento and
Vitoria’s writings shows how he opposed it.78 The Requerimiento recognized the universal authority of the pope on earthly matters.79 However,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 540-41.
PIMENTEL, supra note 58, at 89-90.
See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
PEREÑA, supra note 40, at 34-45.
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 259.
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Vitoria believed the pope did not have authority on earthly matters. The
Requerimiento explained the universal Lordship of Jesus Christ, which
was transmitted to the Apostle Peter, and then transferred to the pope to
give him power. However, according to Vitoria, Christ did not transfer
political power to the pope. The pope could not have universal political
power by natural law, positive law, or by the law of nations.80
Contrary to the discourse of the Requerimiento, Vitoria believed that
the pope did not have the political power to take away the sovereignty of
indigenous nations and give it to the king of Spain. Moreover, even if the
pope had such power, he could not grant it to the king of Spain. Regarding
his rejection of the pope’s authority over indigenous nations and the doctrines of the Requerimiento, Vitoria stated: “ . . . if the barbarians refuse
to recognize any dominion (dominium) of the pope’s, war cannot on that
account be declared on them, nor their goods seized.”81 Francisco de Vitoria rejected the arguments of some canon lawyers, especially Hostiensis
and Silvestre Prierias, who believed in the temporal authority of the pope
over the entire world.82 Vitoria rejected the idea of an unlimited papal
authority on earthly matters, which was the foundation of the Requerimiento.83 Vitoria believed that the pope did not have dominium potestate
civili.84
Vitoria indicated it was self-evident that the universal authority of
the pope could not be sustained by either natural or human law.85 The
only possible source of the pope’s authority on earthly matters was divine
law. However, Vitoria believed that Christ did not give the pope universal
jurisdiction on earthly matters.86 Vitoria sustained his view by indicating
that the pope did not have spiritual jurisdiction over non-Christians, and
therefore he could not have jurisdiction over temporal matters.87 He also
argued that even if the pope had temporal jurisdiction, he could not have
given it to secular rulers because if it existed, it would have belonged to
the institution of the papacy.88
Because Francisco de Vitoria recognized the temporal authority of
the pope on earthly matters, which were directly related to spiritual ones,
80. Id. at 260.
81. Id. at 263.
82. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS O LIBERTAD DE LOS INDIOS 43 (Luciano
Pereña & Jose M. Pérez Prendes eds., 1967).
83. Id. at 46.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 46-47.
86. Id. at 48.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 49.
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the pope could invalidate civil laws of Christian countries if they promoted sinful behaviour.89 He could also order Christian sovereigns to stop
wars which damage the spiritual wellbeing of their people.90 The pope
could occasionally appoint new Christian sovereigns.91 If the majority of
indigenous people became Christian, the pope could impose Christian
sovereigns to indigenous nations. In a limited sense, the pope had access
to the two sources of power, secular and ecclesiastical.92
For Vitoria, it was very clear that the pope did not have jurisdiction
over non-Christian nations.93 Consistent with this view, just wars could
not be waged against indigenous nations and their territories could not be
taken away based on papal authority.94 Vitoria believed that even if indigenous nations rejected Jesus Christ as saviour, war could not be waged
against them. Therefore, it would be illogical and contradictory to wage
wars against them because they rejected papal authority.95
In his letter to Miguel Arcos, Vitoria recognized the limited jurisdiction of the king of Spain in the New World.96 Even assuming that indigenous nations were sovereign, similar to European nations, for Vitoria, they could have been under the authority of a higher sovereign—the
king of Spain. This was based on his view on the existence of higher and
lower levels of territorial and political dominium (dominium altum and
dominium bassum).97 Despite his recognition of a certain type of dominium of the Spanish Crown, he rejected a European emperor’s universal
authority.
The recognition of a European emperor’s authority over indigenous
territories was another foundation of the Requerimiento. Vitoria argued
against the view of Bartolus of Sasoferrato, who recognized the authority
of the European emperor over the entire world.98 If the emperor could
only have dominium totius orbis, it could be by natural law, human law,
or divine law. Based on Thomas Aquinas’ views, Vitoria indicated that
by natural law all human beings were free, and therefore the emperor
could not have dominium over the entire world.99 Vitoria only recognized

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
VITORIA, supra note 17, at 332.
VITORIA, supra note 82, at 34.
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 252.
VITORIA, supra note 82, at 36.
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the dominium parents had over their children and husbands over their
wives to be consistent with natural law.100
Regarding divine law, Vitoria distinguished two possibilities: (1)
there was an emperor before Christ came to earth, or (2) Christ established an emperor. Vitoria indicated that before Christ, there was no emperor over the entire world because the Jewish people were not subject to
any universal emperor, such as Nebuchadnezzar. Also, Hebrew law prohibited the recognition of any foreign sovereign.101 Vitoria indicated that
after Noah, the world was divided into various territories and kingdoms,
and the descendants of Noah created diverse nations.102
Vitoria indicated that, in Christ’s humanity, it was not certain that
Christ had temporal authority. Vitoria wrote: “. . . it is by no means certain that Christ was temporal master of the world according to his humanity - more probably not, since the Lord himself seems to have asserted
‘[m]y kingdom is not of this world’ (John 18:36).”103 Vitoria thought that
even if Jesus Christ had temporal authority, the scriptures did not mention
that he left it to an emperor.104 To prove his point, Vitoria mentioned the
division of jurisdiction between the Western and Eastern part of the
Christian European Empire. 105
Vitoria rejected the universal authority of the emperor by human law
because there was not an enactment (lex) which could have granted him
such authority. Even if there was such a law, it would be invalid because
an emperor would not have jurisdiction to create it.106 He wrote: “. . . the
emperor did not have universal jurisdiction before the enactment of the
law, the enactment could not be binding on those who were not his subjects.”107
Francisco Suarez, consistent with Vitoria’s views, also rejected the
emperor’s universal jurisdiction. He believed that the Roman emperor
was neither the lord of the universe nor had universal jurisdiction over
the entire world.108 The emperor did not receive universal jurisdiction
from God, was not elected by the nations of the world, nor did he conquer
the world by war.109 Suarez believed that there was no worldwide
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 257.
See FRANCISCO SUAREZ, On Laws and God the Lawgiver, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE
WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ 671 (James Brown Scott ed., 1944).
109. Id. at 671.
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consensus to grant universal power to the Roman emperor.110 He was
given that authority by the Roman people; therefore, his authority was
limited to that jurisdiction.111 Jesus Christ did not grant the pope authority
over temporal matters.112 Therefore, the pope could not give the emperor
any power he did not have, such as secular earthly power. 113 In the Andean region, Solórzano de Pereira followed Vitoria’s ideas and believed
that the New World was not under the jurisdiction of the European emperor.114
Vitoria rejected the use of deception or coercion to force indigenous
nations to accept agreements such as the Requerimiento, writing:
The barbarians do not realize what they are doing; perhaps, indeed, they do not even understand what it is the Spaniards are
asking to them. Besides which, the request is made by armed
men, who surround a fearful and defenceless crowd. Furthermore, since the barbarians already had their own true masters
and princes, as explained above, a people cannot without reasonable cause seek new masters, which would be to the detriment of their previous lords.115
Vitoria’s rejection of the doctrinal elements of the Requerimiento
was a significant contribution against one of the central 16th century
Spanish normative discourses which justified the conquest of the New
World.
The Capitulations of Toledo, the Alexandrian Papal Bulls and the
Requerimiento were medieval normative instruments which granted
Spain legal authority to conquer the Inca and other indigenous territories.
Vitoria’s rejection of the doctrinal foundations of those normative instruments was based on his belief that positive laws, which contradicted natural law, were not true laws.116 Vitoria’s rejection of the theological and
philosophical foundations of the normative instruments which justified
the conquest of the New World created a doubt about the legality of the
Spanish actions.117 This also created the conditions for the creation of new
legal instruments, known as the New Laws of the Indies, applicable to the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 672-74.
Id. at 674.
5 JUAN DE SOLÓRZANA Y PEREIRA, DE INDIARUM IURE: LIBER II: DE ACQUISITONE
INDIARUM: CAP. 16-25, at 281 (C. Baciero ed., 2000).
115. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 276.
116. See VITORIA, supra note 82.
117. See, e.g., PEREÑA, supra note 40, at 23.
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international relations between Spain and the indigenous nations of the
New World.
Vitoria’s normative doctrines influenced the making of the New
Laws of the Indies and other normative instruments,118 which shaped the
actions and decisions of the king of Spain, the Council of Indies and other
Spanish institutions.119 The New Laws of the Indies, also known as the
Laws and Ordinances Newly Made by His Majesty for the Government
of the Indies and the Good Treatment and Preservation of the Indians or
New Laws, addressed issues regarding the structure of the Spanish colonial regime in the New World and its treatment of indigenous persons.120
The Council of the Indies in Seville and the Viceroyalties of New
Spain and Peru, among others, were responsible for implementing the
New Laws. Those laws were promulgated to recognise the humanity of
the Incas and other indigenous nations. The Spanish conquerors in Peru
rejected the New Laws and refused to abolish the encomienda which was
an institution like slavery. 121
The Spanish Viceroy, Blasco Núñez de Vela, was responsible for
the application of the New Laws of the Indies in Peru to ameliorate the
situation of the Incas and other indigenous people. The Spanish conquerors, led by Gonzalo Pizarro, opposed the New Laws and the actions of
Blasco Núñez. The conquerors assassinated Núñez in order to stop the
implementation of the laws.122 The norms of the New Laws became part
of a codification of the general Laws of the Indies, a body of colonial
Spanish law, which was applied since the conquest of the New World
until the formation of independent Latin American nations.123
For Vitoria, before the Spanish arrival to the New World, there
were no legal justifications for the conquest of indigenous nations. Therefore, consistent with Vitoria’s ideas, the Spanish conquest of the Inca
realm did not have legal justifications. If Vitoria’s rejection of fundamental colonial doctrines is properly considered, it cannot be concluded that
he was the founder of a colonial and ethnocentric international normative
discourse. Rather than being peripheral in Vitoria’s doctrinal structure,
118. See José Manuel Pérez-Prendes & Muñoz de Arraco, El Derecho Indiano, Modelador de
la America Española, in FORUM HISPANO AMERICANO, ESPAÑA Y LOS VALORES ÉTICOS EN LA
FORMACIÓN DE AMERICA: CASINO DE MADRID, FEBRERO-MAYO 1999, at 91 (2000).
119. For one of the best studies on the Council of Indies, see ERNESTO SCHAFER, EL CONSEJO
REAL Y SUPREMO DE LAS INDIAS: SU HISTORIA, ORGANIZACIÓN Y LABOR ADMINISTRATIVA HASTA
LA TERMINACIÓN DE LA CASA DE AUSTRIA (2003).
120. See MCALISTER, supra note 56, at 162.
121. See BERTRÁN, supra note 66, at 208.
122. ENCICLOPEDIA TEMÁTICA DEL PERÚ, supra note 60, at 167.
123. See, e.g., MCALISTER, supra note 56, at 162.
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his rejection of the pope and European emperor’s authority in the New
World is of central importance.
V. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, THE CONQUEST OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
Even though Francisco de Vitoria recognised that the law of nations
was a part of natural law, he also acknowledged its positive law elements.
How was he able to integrate the natural and positive aspects of the law
of nations? Vitoria integrated will and reason based on his view of eternal
law as the source of integration and unity of all systems of law. He also
used the scholastic dialectic method to reconcile opposite concepts. Regarding integrative jurisprudence, Professor Harold Berman believes that
“[p]rior to the eighteenth century, positivist, naturalist, and historicists
theories were not separate ‘schools’ but rather three complementary perspectives on law.”124
Francisco de Vitoria had an integrative perspective of law. This approach was seen in his law of nations’ doctrines. For example, respect for
the right to life was considered a fundamental norm of natural law, and
grave violations of natural law justified the application of the law of nations to use force against countries which systematically killed innocent
persons.
The scholastic dialectic method served to integrate contrary ideas.
Francisco de Vitoria’s use of this method is seen in his comparison of
opposite perspectives to find truth. He often states his opponents’ views
first, then contradicts those statements, proving the logical and intellectual superiority of his perspective or asserting the synthesis of both positions. 125 The interaction and interrelation between natural law and positive law is seen in Vitoria’s perspective on the law of nations.126
According to him:
. . . there are certainly many things which are clearly to be settled on the basis of the law of nations (ius gentium), whose derivation from natural law is manifestly sufficient to enable it to
enforce binding rights. But even on the occasions when it is not
derived from natural law, the consent of the greater part of the

124. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION
292 (1993).
125. For an explanation of the scholastic dialectic method see HAROLD J BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION, THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 148 (1983) (explaining the
scholastic dialectic method).
126. Id.
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world is enough to make it binding, especially when it is for the
common good of all men.127
Regarding Vitoria’s views on the law of nations, Juan Cruz indicates
that Vitoria’s ideas were based on the recognition of “the anthropological
and ethical dimensions of original sin, which disturb human nature.”128
Cruz believes that Thomas Aquinas recognised the existence of a law of
sin or lex fomitis. This was an internal inclination of human beings towards evil and selfishness, which existed in human nature because of
original sin.129 In his work On Homicide, Vitoria also recognized the existence of the law of sin.130 Vitoria followed Thomas Aquinas’ view that
human beings, initially, received from God a law consistent with their
good and rational nature.131 As a result of original sin, human beings often
choose to act against their nature and rational thinking.132 For Cruz, the
lex fomitis was a presupposition recognised by Vitoria and the Spanish
scholastic school of thought which explains the function of the law of
nations.133 Regarding the differences between the law of nations and natural law in Vitoria’s thinking, Juan Cruz writes:
. . . if “natural law” responds to a nature, which . . . keeps determinant aspects of human beings, the “law of nations” exists to
resolve contradictory tensions which human nature is penalized
and weakened with . . . Because of this, in the reasoning used to
deduce each concrete “law of nations,” natural law is in the main
premise, the application of the theological hypothesis in the minor premise, and the formulation of the correspondent law in the
conclusion. This makes a concrete “law of nations” the expression of a convenient adjustment to save the natural law formulated in the main premise. In this sense, only through the theological hypothesis, the law of nations comes closer to natural
law, but it comes closer to positive law because of the deliberation and voluntary effort of human beings in the process of admitting and reaching consensus.134
For Cruz, Vitoria believed that the law of nations was convenient
for the existence of human beings because of their fragility and social
127. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 280-81.
128. Juan Cruz, La Soportable Fragilidad de la Ley Natural: Consignación Transitiva del Ius
Gentium en Vitoria, in LEY Y DOMINIO EN FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 13, 14 (Ediciones Universidad
de Navarra (EUNSA) ed. 2008).
129. Id.
130. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTION ON HOMICIDE 69, 71 (John P. Doyle trans., 1997).
131. LEY Y DOMINIO EN FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, supra note 128, at 14.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id.
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nature.135 Regarding the integrative nature of the law of nations, Teófilo
Urdanoz writes: “[t]his harmonic conception of Vitoria’s law of nations
prevailed in the next centuries . . . Even the first scholars distinguished
an ‘ius gentium’ natural and the positive norms of ‘ius gentium voluntariou’ according to the terminology of Grotius.”136
Vitoria acknowledged the authority of the international community
to create laws of universal validity reflected in the law of nations which
were based on the consensus of nations. The natural law aspect of the law
of nations implied the participation of humankind in eternal law. Eternal
law was also the final source of authority for the positive aspect of the
law of nations, and its violations were considered sins. Regarding this
concept Vitoria said:
. . . international law has not only the force of a pact and agreement among men, but also the force of a law; for the world as a
whole, being in a way one single State, has the power to create
laws that are just and fitting for all persons, as are the rules of
international law. Consequently, it is clear that they, who violate
these international rules, whether in peace or in war, commit a
mortal sin; moreover, in the gravest matters, such as the inviolability of ambassadors, it is not permissible for one country to
refuse to be bound by international law, the latter having been
established by the authority of the whole world.137
David Kennedy’s main criticism of Vitoria’s ideas is about the unity
of moral and legal concepts. For him, Vitoria was a primitive writer because of his religious worldview which integrated divine, natural, and
positive law.138 The problem with Kennedy’s analysis is that he does not
consider Vitoria’s ideas in their historical context. In the 16th century
Spanish intellectual context, the integration of natural and positive laws
was possible because of the belief in the existence of eternal law which
served as a foundation for the integration of all types of laws.
Francisco de Vitoria rejected the medieval doctrine of discovery,
which justified the Spanish conquest of indigenous nations. However, he
believed that the Spanish presence in the New World could be justified
because of the natural law principle of communication and fellowship
between nations. For him, the rational and social nature of human beings
was the foundation for the relations between individuals and for the
135. Id. at 34.
136. See Teófilo Urdanoz, Síntesis Teológico-Jurídica de la Doctrina de Vitoria, in RELECTIO
DE INDIS O LIBERTAD DE LOS INDIOS cxxxv (Luciano Pereña & Jose M. Pérez Prendes eds., 1967).
137. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 172.
138. See David W. Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 23 (1986).
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relationships between political communities. The principle of natural
communication and fellowship was the foundation for the norms of free
trade, travel, and evangelism. Vitoria’s justification for the Spanish presence in the New World was based on these norms.139 Robert Williams
believes that Vitoria’s proposal of international norms regarding the right
to travel, trade, and religious freedom were, in fact, Spanish norms which
were created to justify the Spanish conquest of the New World.140
Francisco de Vitoria accepted, in general, the validity of the medieval law norm of discovery. This norm stated that nations could occupy
territories which did not belong to any other nation (terra nullius). However, Vitoria rejected the application of that norm in the case of the indigenous nations of the New World which had legitimate political communities and dominion over their territories.141
Vitoria’s reasoning was sustained by the fact that indigenous nations
were rightful owners of their territories. Therefore, Spain could not discover and take over territories which already had owners. Vitoria indicated that indigenous nations could also have discovered Spain.142 However, this would not have justified the use of force against indigenous
nations. Therefore, the Spaniards could not occupy territories which legitimately belonged to the Incas, Aztecs, and other indigenous nations.
This aspect of Vitoria’s ideas cannot be underestimated. For the 16th century Spanish context, the rejection of the right to discovery, as a norm
applicable to the conquest of the New World, was an important effort to
promote a universal perspective which favoured the interests of indigenous political communities.
Regarding the natural law of nations’ norm of hospitality to foreign
visitors, Vitoria said: “ . . . it is considered inhumane to treat strangers
and travellers badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to
behave hospitably to strangers. This would not be the case if travellers
were doing something evil by visiting foreign nations.”143 Vitoria believed that since the creation of the world there was a common ownership
of property. Because of this, every human being could travel and visit any
part of the world. For him, this norm was not abolished by the division of

139. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 280.
140. See, e.g., WILLIAMS JR., supra note 50, at 106-07.
141. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS, CARTA MAGNA DE LOS INDIOS 85-86
(1989).
142. CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 107 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2006) (explaining the analysis of the reciprocal
application of Vitoria’s doctrines to Spain and indigenous nations).
143. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 278.
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property (division rerum).144 This natural law of nations’ norm required
welcoming and showing hospitality to foreign visitors.145 Indigenous people, consistent with natural law, were supposed to show love to other fellow human beings and allow the free entry of Spanish visitors to their
territories.146 Indigenous positive laws could not contradict that fundamental norm of natural law.147 Regarding this, Vitoria wrote:
. . . if the Spaniards were not allowed to travel amongst them,
this would be either by natural, divine or human law. But they
are certainly allowed to do so by divine and natural law. But if
there were a human enactment (lex) which barred them without
any foundation in divine or natural law, it would be inhumane
and unreasonable, and therefore without the force of law.148
In the 16th century Spanish context, the norm that recognized the
Spanish people’s right to travel to indigenous territories was not considered inherently antagonistic to the common good of humankind or to the
interests of indigenous nations. Vitoria’s doctrine included the condition
of the peaceful implementation of that norm and respect for the interests
of indigenous political communities.149 However, a more universal perspective would have considered the indigenous sovereigns’ will to deny
the entry of Spanish citizens to indigenous territories for any reason. Already in 1672, Samuel Pufendorf made this criticism.150 In rejecting Vitoria’s ideas, he said:
Furthermore, it is crude indeed to try to give others so indefinite
a right to journey and live among us, with no thought of the
numbers in which they come, their purpose in coming, as well
as of the question whether, in passing through without harm and
visiting a foreign land, they propose to stay but a short time, or
to settle among us permanently, as if upon some right of theirs.151
For Vitoria, one of the main Spanish objectives in the New World
was to trade with indigenous nations. Vitoria’s norm, which recognized
the right to free trade, could have been considered universal and just in
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Ramón Hernández Martin, Francisco de Vitoria, “Condicionantes” de su Doctrina Indiana, in 137 CIENCIA TOMISTA 15, 27 (2010).
146. Id. at 28.
147. For an analysis of the imposition of natural law against the law of indigenous communities, see WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 50, at 101.
148. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 279.
149. Id.
150. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 364-65 (C. H.
Oldfather & William Abbott trans., 1934).
151. Id.
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the 16th century Spanish context if trade benefited all sides. However,
this was not the case. While Vitoria acknowledged the reciprocity principle in international trade, he disregarded the unequal levels of power and
its impact on the relationships between Spain and indigenous nations.152
Regarding Vitoria’s view, Robert Williams says: “Vitoria had elevated
the profit motive to an extremely privileged status in his totalizing discourse of a universally obligatory natural Law of Nations. Mercantile
self-interest was conceptualized as binding nations to one another.”153
For Antony Anghie, indigenous people were unable to fulfill the
Spanish norm of free trade.154 Therefore, any indigenous violation of that
norm was considered an injury against the Spaniards.155 China Mieville
indicated that to talk about free trade in the 16th century historical context
was absurd because of the difference of power between Spain and indigenous nations.156 These criticisms are consistent with historical facts.
However, Vitoria recognised that both indigenous nations and Spain had
the right to reciprocal trade if this did not damage the interests of indigenous nations.157 Regarding this, Vitoria wrote:
. . . the Spaniards may lawfully trade among the barbarians, so
long as they do no harm to their homeland. In other words, they
may import the commodities which they lack, and export the
gold, silver, or other things which they have in abundance; and
their princes cannot prevent their subjects from trading with the
Spaniards, nor can the princes of Spain prohibit commerce with
the barbarians.158
Vitoria recognized that there were certain lands in indigenous territories which were held in common between indigenous nations and Spanish people.159 This clear ethnocentric view was used to justify the Spanish
takeover of certain indigenous nation’s goods and property.160 Vitoria
also applied this ethnocentric view to gold, and gold was one of the main
reasons for the Spanish invasion of the New World. Vitoria justified the
takeover of indigenous gold based on the principle of common

152. Mantilla, supra note 1, at 167.
153. WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 50, at 102.
154. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2005).
155. Id. at 21-22.
156. See CHINA MIEVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (2005).
157. See, e.g., CIENCIA TOMISTA, supra note 145, at 28-29.
158. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 279.
159. See ANGHIE, supra note 154, at 21-22.
160. See POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 280.
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ownership.161 However, Vitoria said that if the exportation of gold from
indigenous territories was contrary to the interests of indigenous nations,
Spanish rulers had the obligation to end that type of unjust trade.162
Vitoria believed that trade was the foundation for the relations between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New World.163 He also
believed that even if the Spaniards had to leave indigenous territories,
trade between Spain and indigenous nations could continue.164 This
would have allowed the Spanish Crown to continue increasing its income
by taxing gold and silver which were exported from indigenous territories.165 Vitoria compared the Spanish presence in the New World with the
Portuguese presence in Brazil.166 The difference for him was that the Portuguese based their international relations with indigenous nations on free
trade and not on colonization.167
The norm that allowed the evangelization of indigenous people was
consistent with 16th century Spanish concepts of international justice. Vitoria believed that this favored indigenous people’s interests because it
gave them the opportunity to accept eternal salvation.168 However, authors critical of Vitoria’s views interpret his norm of evangelism as an
instrument of colonialism and Christian oppression.169 Regarding this,
Robert Williams said:
Vitoria’s discourse supplemented this papal power with the
recognition that Christians possessed autonomously grounded
rights under the Law of Nations to travel, trade, and preach the
gospel in barbarian lands without first obtaining a papal license.
In Vitoria’s discourse of New World conquest, reason as well as
Rome were granted the right to initiate enforcement of Christian
Europe’s universally binding norms and values in lands possessed by heathens and infidels.170
Onuma Yasuaki believes that Vitoria’s efforts to impose Christianity in the New World proves the ethnocentric colonial characteristics of

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 279-81.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 291-92.
Id.
WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 50, at 104-05.
See, e.g., Onuma Yasuaki, Eurocentrism in the History of International Law, in A
NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, PEACE, AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIUS at 373-86 (Onuma
Yasuaki ed., 1993).
170. Id. at 105-06.
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his normative ideas.171 Regarding Vitoria’s justification for the conversion of indigenous people to Christianity, Anghie writes:
[O]nce Vitoria outlines and consolidates the authority of a secular jus gentium, which is administered by the sovereign, he reintroduces Christian norms within this secular system; proselytising is authorised now, not by divine law, but the law of nations,
and may be likened now to the secular activities of travelling
and trading . . . Now, Indian resistance to conversion is a cause
for war, not because it violates divine law, but the jus gentium
administered by the sovereign.172
Vitoria had complex views regarding the evangelization of indigenous peoples. He justified the Spanish use of force to protect indigenous
people who converted to Christianity.173 He believed that where there
were a great number of indigenous converts to Christianity, the pope had
the authority to replace “pagan” kings with Christian ones.174 Vitoria’s
justification of the Spanish conquest for the evangelization of indigenous
people had three elements: first, force could not be used to oblige indigenous nations to convert to Christianity; second, force could be used if
indigenous nations did not allow Spanish missionaries to share their faith;
and third, if the use of force would result in extreme violent actions,
which could become a hindrance for the evangelization of indigenous nations, wars should not be waged.175
The rejection of using force to oblige indigenous nations to convert
to Christianity, and the conditional element of Vitoria’s justification to
use force to allow the preaching of Christianity, was consistent with 16th
century universal perspectives of Spanish authors such as Bartolomé de
las Casas.176 However, Vitoria’s justification to use force to allow the
preaching of Christianity was consistent with ethnocentric views such as
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s.177 A more universal norm would have allowed indigenous nations to have the freedom to reject or accept any
Spanish religious efforts.
For Spanish scholastic thinkers such as Vitoria, the peaceful evangelization of indigenous people was a central reason for the Spanish

171. See A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, PEACE, AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIUS, supra
note 169, at 375-86.
172. ANGHIE, supra note 154, at 23.
173. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 286.
174. Id. at 287.
175. VITORIA, supra note 82, at XXXIV, 52.
176. DE LAS CASAS, supra note 15, at 17-21.
177. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 11-12.
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presence in the New World.178 Vitoria justified the use of force to guarantee the Spanish “right” to share the Catholic faith.179 Vitoria did not
indicate if indigenous people, such as the Inca, should also have had the
freedom to share their faith in Wiracocha and other deities.
Unlike Vitoria, who never lived in the New World, Bartolomé de
las Casas knew well the consequences of the application of the natural
law of nations to indigenous people. This was because he lived in the
New World and was aware of the great injustices committed by Spanish
conquerors.180 Other than the peaceful evangelization of indigenous nations, de las Casas believed there was no reason for the Spanish presence
in indigenous territories.181
Antony Anghie’s and other scholars’ criticism of Francisco de Vitoria’s international legal ideas as inherently unjust, ethnocentric, and colonial applies better to Sepúlveda’s views. The ideas which influenced
Sepúlveda’s thinking were based on the following presuppositions: the
ethnic inferiority of the people of the New World, the idolatry of indigenous nations as a sign of their inferiority, and the practice of human sacrifice as a sign of their irrationality.182
Sepúlveda’s understanding of the law of nations, which he equated
with human natural law, had strong ethnocentric presumptions. For him,
the law of nations did not apply to “barbarian” indigenous nations because they were outside humanity.183 For Sepúlveda, natural law was determined by the opinion of intelligent persons.184 Consequently, he believed “naturally and ethically superior people should determine what is
just according to nature.”185 Sepúlveda recognized that there was a part of
natural law which was immutable, but there were also natural precepts
that changed according to circumstances.186 According to Sepúlveda, positive law derived from natural law.187 Therefore, to him there were two
types of natural law: one which applied to human beings and animals, and

178. See Carlos Baciero, Universidad y Política Colonial, 78 ESTUDIOS ECLESIÁSTICOS 549,
589 (2003).
179. Id. at 559.
180. DEMETRIO RAMOS ET AL., FRANCISCO DE VITORIA Y LA ESCUELA DE SALAMENCA: LA
ÉTICA EN LA CONQUISTA DE AMÉRICA 262 (1984).
181. Id. at 254.
182. José A. Fernández-Santamaria, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Nature of the American
Indians, 31 AMERICAS 434, 436 (1975).
183. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 8-9.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 9.
186. Id. at 10.
187. Id.
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another that applied only to human beings, known as ius gentium.188 Francisco de Vitoria rejected this perspective and recognized the existence of
only one natural law that applied to all human beings. One of Sepúlveda’s
main presuppositions was that the law of nations applied only to what he
considered to be “civilized” nations.189 His understanding of civilized nations excluded indigenous people of the New World which he considered
objects of the law.190
For Sepúlveda, to be a Christian meant to be “civilized” and European, and to be an indigenous person meant to be a “barbarian” and not
part of humankind.191 Therefore, Sepúlveda’s cultural ethnocentric perspective on natural law was based on ethnic stereotypes and the defense
of the interests of one culture. This perspective led to the disregard of
violent actions committed by Spain, such as the killing of innocent indigenous people. Sepúlveda justified his view regarding the inferiority of
indigenous people based on an ethnocentric interpretation of law. According to him:
[I]t will always be just and consistent with natural law that such
people will be submitted to the empire of culturally superior and
humane princes and nations, so that because of their virtues and
the prudence of their laws, they will take away their barbarity
and transform them to a more humane life and to the cult of virtue. And if they reject such empire, it can be imposed on them
by weapons and such war will be just, as the natural law declares
it.192
Sepúlveda’s perspective on natural law was based on the survival of
the fittest doctrine. This was contrary to fundamental Christian scholastic
principles such as respect for the inherent dignity of human beings. For
Sepúlveda, there were mainly two types of nations.193 The first type were
“civilized” nations which had political communities and obeyed natural
law.194 The second type of nations were “uncivilized” because they constantly violated natural law.195 For Sepúlveda, indigenous nations could
not have political communities because they were sub-human, evidenced
by their primitive cultures, idolatry, and underdeveloped economic

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
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Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Fernández-Santamaria, supra note 182, at 436.
Id.
Id.
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systems.196 But, Sepúlveda disregarded the fact that supposed “civilized”
nations also were capable of grave violations of the norms of natural law.
According to Sepúlveda, the most important principle of natural law
was “that the perfect must prevail and dominate over the imperfect, the
excellent over his contrary.”197 Sepúlveda viewed the Inca, Aztec, and
other indigenous nations as inferior and inhuman; therefore, the laws
which regulated the relations between the superior nation, Spain, and inferior nations had to reflect that asymmetry. Manuel García Pelayo, regarding Sepúlveda’s ideological foundations that justified the conquest
of the New World, writes: “[t]he problem is manifested in the incompatibility of a Natural Law which human beings know because of its quality,
and another conception of the same juridical area, which is restricted to a
part of humankind, and that only a selected minority can know.”198
For Sepúlveda, indigenous people were inherently evil and had an
inferior intellect.199 Therefore, the Spanish conquest was consistent with
his version of natural law, which indicated that “barbarian” nations had
to submit to civilized ones.200 Contrary to Sepúlveda’s perspective, Vitoria believed that the natural law of nations applied to all nations, including
indigenous nations.201 This was an effort to transcend the Spanish 16th
century cultural setting and find a common ground between Spain and
the indigenous nations of the New World. Vitoria’s intention was to find
common human nature and apply natural law norms to all nations.202
Contrary to Sepúlveda’s inherently ethnocentric views, Vitoria believed that natural law applied to nations from diverse cultures including
the indigenous of the New World.203 Vitoria’s view was based on the
recognition of the existence of one human nature.204 This was contrary to
Sepúlveda’s view on the existence of a civilized European human nature
and a sub-human indigenous one.205 Vitoria’s natural law of nations’ doctrine was an effort to apply what he considered to be universal norms to
political communities from diverse civilizations. However, that effort
could also be considered a discourse which promoted ethnocentric norms
as if they were universal.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 83.
Id. at 13.
Fernández-Santamaria, supra note 182, at 437.
Id. at 436-37.
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 278.
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Id. at 279.
Fernández-Santamaria, supra note 182, at 437.
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The norm of free trade could be considered just if Spain and the
indigenous nations of the New World had similar levels of socio-economic development. Vitoria did not carefully consider the implications
of the implementation of the natural law of nations’ norms to specific
historical circumstances in which Spain could have imposed its will on
indigenous nations.
Vitoria lacked the historical jurisprudential component of what Harold Berman describes as the integrative jurisprudence of pre-enlightenment Christian thinkers.206 Because of this, the problem with Vitoria’s
law of nations’ ideas was that norms which could justly apply to the relations between nations, had ethnocentric consequences when applied in
concrete historical and cultural settings such as the ones of the New
World. In part, this was because Vitoria did not have a deep understanding of indigenous cultures. Unlike other Spanish thinkers such as Bartolomé de las Casas, he never lived in the New World. Vitoria did not
properly consider the historical realities of the indigenous nations of the
New World and the Spanish conquest. If he did, he could have suggested
the application of free trade norms, which considered the unequal relations of power between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New
World. He also could have forbid the Spanish exploitation of indigenous
natural resources.
One of Antony Anghie’s main criticisms of Vitoria’s international
legal ideas is the imposition of Spanish normative standards to the indigenous nations of the New World.207 This is a valid criticism because those
standards were used to subjugate and exploit indigenous nations.208 However, the rejection of Vitoria’s proposal about the existence of natural law
norms could have been used to justify actions of extreme violence practiced by indigenous nations, such as human sacrifice, and Spanish conquerors, such as massacres. Vitoria’s intention was probably not to create
an inherently unjust ethnocentric system of law to justify his country’s
conquest and colonization of indigenous nations. Most likely, he believed
that he was justly applying universal principles of natural law to diverse
civilizations such as Spain and the Inca of the New World.
VI. VITORIA’S NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR
In the 16th century Spanish context, one of the main conflicts of
worldviews was between those who believed that only power politics was
the foundation for international relations between nations, and those who
206. BERMAN, supra note 124, at 292.
207. ANGHIE, supra note 154, at 21.
208. Id. at 21-22.
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recognized the existence of a just universal normative order that all nations should respect. From a political power perspective, Spain’s use of
force to conquer and civilize “barbarian” nations was justified because of
national interests. For example, regarding wars against the nations of the
New World, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda wrote:
[t]here are other just causes of war, less clear and less frequent,
but because of this not less just, and not less founded in natural
and divine law; and one of them is to subjugate with weapons,
if it is not possible using other means, those that because of their
natural condition must obey others.209
Unlike Sepúlveda, Francisco de Vitoria believed that having the
force to conquer other nations was not enough; it was also necessary to
obey normative precepts of the law of nations and natural law.210 Francisco Suarez was one of the most sophisticated followers of Francisco de
Vitoria’s doctrines on the use of force.211 Suarez also rejected power politics as a reason to wage wars, stating “[t]here was an old error current
among the Gentiles, who thought that the rights of nations were based on
military strength, and that it was permissible to make war solely to acquire prestige and wealth; a belief which, even from the standpoint of
natural reason, is most absurd.”212
For Vitoria, in domestic law, a political community had the authority to punish violations of the normative order.213 A political community
could also acquire jurisdiction over foreign political communities and
could use force against them when their domestic laws did not punish
widespread injuries against innocent human beings.214
Vitoria and his followers applied Thomas Aquinas’ ideas regarding
just war (bellum justum), including just causes for war (jus ad bellum),
and the law applicable during war (jus in bello), to the concrete historical
setting of the Spanish conquest of the New World.215 For Vitoria, it was

209. GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 81.
210. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, LOS PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO PUBLICO EN FRANCISCO DE
VITORIA 78 (Antonio Truyol Serra ed., 1946).
211. FRANCISCO SUAREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ 16a-17a
(James Brown Scott ed., 1944).
212. FRANCISCO SUAREZ, A Work on the Three Theological Virtues Faith, Hope and Charity,
in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ 815-16 (James Brown Scott ed.,
1944).
213. VITORIA, supra note 210, at 78.
214. VITORIA, supra note 82, at 43.
215. ANGELA APARISI MIRALLES, DERECHO A LA PAZ Y DERECHO A LA GUERRA EN
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 14-15 (2007).
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not enough for a sovereign to believe that a war was just.216 He also had
to know the just causes for war, and had to listen to the reasoning of his
enemies to find out if they wanted to negotiate peace agreements consistent with just and reasonable principles.217 Sovereigns had the obligation to seek the advice of knowledgeable persons on the subject of war.218
For Vitoria, wars could not be just for both sides of the armed conflict.219
There was an exception when there was ignorance of the facts or the law,
or when the wrong side waged a war in good faith.220 The problem with
Vitoria’s view is that the side that had justice on its side did not always
win wars, as was seen in the case of the Spanish-Inca war of the 16th
century.
One of Vitoria’s main concerns was to make certain that the Spanish
actions in the New World were just.221 He wanted to ensure that the Spanish sovereigns were not sinning by acting contrary to the law of conscience.222 For Vitoria, a sovereign had to ensure the justice of his actions
in war.223 If a sovereign leader of a nation falsely believed that his side
was just in a war, he had the obligation to restore what was taken from
the enemy side upon realizing the injustice of that belief.224
In the 16th century, there were doubts about the morality of Christian involvement in wars.225 Vitoria’s commentaries on Thomas Aquinas
show that he believed Christians could lawfully wage wars; Vitoria argued that leaders of nations were established to defend their republics.226
Vitoria, consistent with Aquinas’ views, believed that the republic had
authority against its enemies to avenge wrongdoings, recover goods, and
punish evil.227 Vitoria, like Aquinas, rejected pacifist arguments which
indicated Christians could not participate in wars under any circumstances.228
216. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE IURE BELLI O PAZ DINÁMICA: ESCUELA
ESPAÑOLA DE LA PAZ, PRIMERA GENERACIÓN 1526-1560, at 139 (Luciano Pereña et al., eds.,
1981).
217. Id. at 141.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 139.
220. Id.
221. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 251-52.
222. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, De Indis Relectio Posterior, Sive de Iure
Belli, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 293, 312 (Jeremy Lawrence & Anthony Pagden eds., 12th prtg.
2010).
223. Id. at 304-06.
224. Id. at 313.
225. VITORIA, supra note 216, at 215.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 217.
228. VITORIA, supra note 222, at 297.
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For Vitoria, the sovereigns of nations had the responsibility to wage
wars only when there were no other options.229 This was because all human beings were created in God’s image, and wars often caused the killing and persecution of innocent human beings.230 Also, sovereigns had
the responsibility to seek peace and not war.231 Another norm indicated
that, in times of war, the prince should seek justice and the self-defense
of his commonwealth and not the destruction of his enemies.232 Once victory was achieved, the winner should act as an impartial judge.233 The
decisions must be just for the injured side, but should also consider the
interest of the defeated side and should not seek its destruction.234
Francisco de Vitoria believed that the “world” granted the leaders
of nations the authority to punish foreign nations that violated the natural
normative order.235 According to Vitoria, republics had the authority to
defend and avenge offenses against their citizens.236 He equated the sovereign authority of the republic with the authority of the prince.237 The
State’s authority to punish wrongdoings was not limited to its domestic
jurisdiction, it could also be used internationally. Regarding this, Vitoria
said:
. . . it should be noted that the prince has the authority not only
over his own people but also over foreigners to force them to
abstain from harming others; this is his right by the law of nations and the authority of the whole world. Indeed, it seems he
has this right by natural law: the world could not exist unless
some men had the power and authority to deter the wicked by
force from doing harm to the good and the innocent.238
Vitoria’s recognition of the legality of the use of force in cases of
violations of the natural normative order was consistent with Thomas
Aquinas’ medieval doctrines of war.239 Vitoria further developed Aquinas’ doctrines that nations had authority to use force as a just punishment
against other nations.240 His writings were an effort to give a normative
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Id. at 326-27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 327.
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Id. at 305.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
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justification for the Spanish presence in the New World, as well as undermine arguments which were based only on power-politics.241
In the 16th century Spanish historical context, it was not unreasonable to recognize the norms of communication, travel, and trade as foundations for the international relations between Spain and the indigenous
nations of the New World. However, if that meant that the Spanish could
take over the territories of indigenous people, such as the Inca, and become its new sovereign, then that part of Vitoria’s normative discourse
could have served as a justification to conquer, colonize, and exploit the
human and natural resources of indigenous nations. Regarding this, Antony Anghie opines: “Vitoria’s scheme finally endorses and legitimizes
endless Spanish incursions into Indian society. Vitoria’s apparently innocuous enunciation of a right to ‘travel’ and ‘sojourn’ extends finally to
the creation of a comprehensive, indeed inescapable system of norms
which are inevitably violated by the Indians.”242
However, for Vitoria, the normative principle of natural partnership
and communication, which was the foundation for the norms of travel
and trade, did not apply when the Spaniards injured indigenous people.243
For example, Vitoria recognized that in the case of the conquest of the
Inca Empire, there were extremely evil actions committed by Spanish
conquerors against indigenous peoples.244 He also believed that the Incas
did not violate the natural law of nations’ norms.245 However, he believed
that other indigenous nations, such as the Aztec, violated natural law.246
Vitoria specifically mentioned the practice of human sacrifice in Yucatan, which he considered a grave violation of natural law which could
have justified the Spanish use of force.247
Vitoria believed that some indigenous nations, such as the Aztec,
were responsible for injuries against innocent people.248 Although this
could justify the Spanish use of force, there was a previous condition
which required respecting the interests of indigenous people. Because of
241. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 284.
242. ANGHIE, supra note 154, at 21.
243. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 278.
244. Vitoria resolved conflicts between diverse sovereign wills by applying natural law principles, such as respect for human dignity and human life. For a criticism of Vitoria’s use of absolute
standards to resolve conflicts between sovereign wills, see Kennedy, supra note 138, at 34-35.
245. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 332.
246. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On Dietary Laws, or Self-Restraint, in POLITICAL WRITINGS
205, 225 (Jeremy Lawrence & Anthony Pagden eds., 12th prtg. 2010).
247. Id. at 214-17. This aspect of Vitoria’s ideas is analyzed in another section of this article.
See Felipe Solis et al., Hernán Cortés y la Conquista de México, in PASAJES DE LA HISTORIA 20,
21 (Felipe Solis ed., 2003).
248. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 225.
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this, Vitoria used the scholastic dialectic method to balance the application of the norms of the natural law of nations with exceptions for their
implementation. Regarding this, James Muldoon writes:
[o]n the one hand the method provided a structured basis for analysing a problem in an orderly way, setting out pros and cons
clearly and enabling the reader to see the consequences of a
course of action. On the other hand, the method can lead to paralysis of the will, balancing each argument for action against a
reason for not acting.249
Vitoria’s conclusion on the illegality of the Spanish use of force
against the Inca Empire was influenced by the scholastic dialectic
method, as well as his doctrine on the conditionality of the implementation of the norms of the natural law of nations.250 According to Vitoria,
the Spaniards had the right to travel within indigenous territories so long
as they did not hurt indigenous people.251 On this, Vitoria said:
“[a]mongst all nations it is considered inhuman to treat strangers and travellers badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to behave
hospitably to strangers. This would not be the case if travellers were doing something evil by visiting foreign nations.”252
Vitoria believed indigenous nations could not have prohibited the
presence of Spanish immigrants in their territories if those immigrants
did not behave in a wrongful manner.253 Regarding this, he said, “[s]ince
these travels of the Spaniards are (as we may for the moment assume)
neither harmful nor detrimental to the barbarians, they are lawful.”254 Vitoria also believed that free trade was just when the Spaniards did not
damage the interests of indigenous nations. Regarding this, he said, “ . . .
the Spaniards may lawfully trade among the barbarians, so long as they
do no harm to their homeland.”255 Vitoria also conditioned the Spanish
right to acquire citizenship in the New World to respect for the requirements of indigenous communities. Regarding this, he said, “[c]onsequently, it seems he would enjoy the same privileges as the rest, at least
as long as he accepted the same burdens as they.”256

249. James Muldoon, Francisco de Vitoria and Humanitarian Intervention, 5 J. OF MIL.
ETHICS 140 (2006).
250. RAMOS ET AL., supra note 180, at 292, 345, 348.
251. CIENCIA TOMISTA, supra note 145, at 27.
252. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 278.
253. See CIENCIA TOMISTA, supra note 145, at 28.
254. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 278.
255. Id. at 279.
256. Id. at 281.
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Vitoria believed that the Spaniards should have demonstrated to indigenous people that they did not have the intention to harm them. Regarding this, he said, “the Spaniards ought first to remove any cause of
provocation by reasoning and persuasion, and demonstrate with every argument at their disposal that they have not come to do harm, but wish to
dwell in peace . . . .”257 Despite Vitoria’s doctrines on the conditionality
of the Spanish presence in the New World, the application of the natural
law of nations’ norms to the unequal relations of power between Spain
and the indigenous nations could have led to colonial and unjust results.
Consistent with Onuma Yasuaki’s view, Vitoria’s norms could unjustly
apply to indigenous political communities because they did not have the
power and economic development to fairly trade with Spain or travel to
Europe.258
There are two elements in Vitoria’s views that seem to be contradictory. On the one hand, Vitoria believed that Spanish conquerors should
not hurt indigenous people’s interests. On the other hand, he indicated
that indigenous nations could not prohibit Spanish people from trading
and immigrating into their lands. Therefore, according to Vitoria, indigenous nations did not have the final authority in their own territories. Vitoria did not consider that even the peaceful presence of Spanish people
in indigenous territories could have been hurtful to the preservation of
indigenous nations and their cultures.
Contrary to Vitoria’s views, Bartolomé de las Casas believed that
none of the indigenous nations injured Spanish people in the New
World.259 Therefore, there was no legal justification to use force against
any indigenous nation. On the contrary, since the beginning of the Spanish conquest, indigenous nations had just causes for war against the Spaniards.260 For De las Casas, the Spanish encounters with indigenous people
should not have had the objective of conquering and colonizing the New
World.261 He believed that the only reason for the Spanish presence in
indigenous territories should have been the peaceful evangelization of its
inhabitants.262

257. Id.
258. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, PEACE, AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIUS, supra note
169, at 372-86.
259. RAMOS ET AL., supra note 180, at 149.
260. Id. at 112.
261. Id. at 149.
262. Id.
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VII. VITORIA’S JUST WAR DOCTRINES AND THE BATTLE OF CAJAMARCA
Consistent with his theological ideas, Francisco de Vitoria believed
that indigenous people’s violations of the norms of the natural law of nations were evil actions against the normative natural order which justified
their punishment.263 From a legal perspective, these actions were considered violations of the law of nations and injuries against Spanish immigrants and visitors to the New World. Because of this, the use of force
against indigenous nations was justified. Based on Thomas Aquinas’ and
St. Augustine’s ideas, Vitoria applied just war doctrines to the conquest
of the New World.264 Vitoria’s view on the beginning of the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire in the Battle of Cajamarca is particularly important. This was one of the most significant historical facts Francisco de
Vitoria mentioned. His doubts about the legality of the conquest of the
New World emerged because of the atrocities committed by Francisco
Pizarro in the Spanish war against the Inca Empire.265
How did Vitoria apply his general just war doctrines to the Spanish
conquest of the Inca Empire? Among the few historical facts that Vitoria
mentioned about the Spanish conquest of the New World, the most important was the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire in the Battle of Cajamarca. The Battle of Cajamarca was a crucial moment in the conquest
of the Inca Empire, and is a key event in understanding Vitoria’s international normative ideas. For Francisco de Vitoria, the Spanish actions in
the city of Cajamarca (1532) violated the norms of just war.266 In that city,
Francisco Pizarro and other Spanish conquerors met the Inca King Atahualpa, who had just defeated his brother, Huascar, in a civil war. Describing this meeting, the Spanish historian, Pedro de Cieza de León,
wrote:
[t]hey began to enter the plaza. When the squadrons reached the
center of it, they formed a very large circle. Atahualpa entered
after many of his captains and their people had done so. He
passed all of them before his litter was set down. Because he
was in the middle of the people, he stood up on top of the platform. He spoke loudly that they should be brave . . . that they
should know that [the Christians] were hiding in fear. He

263.
264.
265.
at 23.
266.

Cavallar, supra note 13, at 188.
MIRALLES, supra note 215, at XIV-XV.
DE BELLO CONTRA INSULANOS INTERVENCIÓN DE ESPAÑA EN AMERICA, supra note 69,
Cavallar, supra note 13, at 191.
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reminded them how they had always vanquished many people
and nations, serving under his and his father’s banners.267
As part of the Spanish strategy, Fray Vicente de Valverde explained,
through his interpreter, Martinillo de Poechos, the medieval colonial law
of the Requerimiento to the Inca King Atahualpa. Valverde explained to
him that he had to accept Christianity, as well as the universal jurisdiction
of the pope and the European emperor. According to the norms of the
Requerimiento, if Atahualpa rejected the Requerimiento, the Spaniards
could use force against him.268 Fray Valverde gave a Bible to King Atahualpa, but he did not understand what was given to him and threw it
away. This action was considered a rejection of the pope, emperor, and
Spain’s jurisdiction in the Inca realm.269 This gave the Spaniards the normative justification they needed to use force against the Inca king and his
people. Juan de Betanzos described the massacre of Cajamarca, as follows:
When the marquis had heard out Fray Vicente about that turn of
events, he made his signal to the artillerymen. When they saw
it, they fired their cannon and the harquebuses. Then everybody
came out at once and fell upon the Inca’s men. The horsemen
lanced them and the foot soldiers cut with their swords without
the Inca’s men putting up any resistance . . . So many men tried
to leave by the plaza’s gate and the Spanish were so persistent
in killing them that a large mass of Indians, as they saw the great
massacre they were suffering, pressed against a stretch of the
wall that circled the plaza and toppled it under their onslaught.270
In the massacre of Cajamarca, the Inca King Atahualpa was kidnapped, and high-level Inca leaders and many other indigenous people
were killed. The Spanish invasion and use of force had the objective of
taking over the natural resources of the Incas, especially gold and silver.
After the massacre of Cajamarca, the Spaniards kidnapped and executed
the king of the Inca Empire. Despite fulfilling a ransom of a room full of
gold and silver, Atahualpa was condemned to death.271
Vitoria knew what happened in Cajamarca and believed that the
Spanish actions were unjust and against the natural law of nations.272 In a
267. PEDRO DE CIEZA DE LEÓN, THE DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST OF PERU 211 (Alexandra
Parma Cook & Noble David Cook eds., trans., 1998).
268. See PIMENTEL, supra note 58, at 89.
269. See DE CIEZA DE LEÓN, supra note 267, at 211.
270. JUAN DE BETANZOS, NARRATIVES OF THE INCAS 263-65 (Roland Hamilton & Dana Buchanan eds., trans., 1996).
271. Id. at 265.
272. See, e.g., RAMOS ET AL., supra note 180, at 292.
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letter to his friend, Miguel de Arcos, on November 8, 1534, Vitoria expressed his opposition to Francisco Pizarro in Cajamarca.273 This was the
beginning of Vitoria’s intellectual task to develop doctrines and a language on the laws applicable to the international relations of Spain with
the indigenous nations of the New World. It was also the beginning of a
quest to apply scholastic norms and principles to relations between nations. The letter was based on Vitoria’s knowledge of the Spanish actions
in the Andean region, which he obtained from testimonies of former missionaries and soldiers who returned to Spain from the Inca realm.274
Francisco de Vitoria, as a theologian, sought to find principles
which reflected the 16th century Spanish scholastic view of truth and justice. He tried to influence the conscience of Spanish sovereigns and people. Regarding the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, in his letter to
Miguel Arcos, Vitoria wrote:
As for the case of Peru, I must tell you, after a lifetime of studies
and long experience, that no business shocks me or embarrasses
me more than the corrupt profits and affairs of the Indies. Their
very mention freezes the blood in my veins . . . I do not understand the justice of the war. I do not dispute the emperor’s right
to conquer the Indies, which I presuppose he may, most strictly;
but as far as I understand from eyewitnesses who were personally present during the recent battle with Atahualpa, neither he
nor any of his people had ever done the slightest injury to the
Christians, nor given them the least grounds for making war on
them . . . But even supposing the justice in the war is all on the
side of the Spaniards, hostilities may not proceed beyond subduing them and compelling them to accept the emperor as prince
with the infliction on them of as little damage and loss as possible. This does not mean robbing them and leaving them destitute
of everything regarding their temporal goods . . . In truth, if the
Indians are not men but monkeys, they are incapable of injury.
But if they are men, and our neighbours, and as they claim vassals of the emperor, I cannot see how to excuse these conquistadors of utter impiety and tyranny; nor can I see what great service they do to His Majesty by ruining his vassals.275
Vitoria believed that one of the main reasons for the conquest of the
Inca Empire was the Spanish conquerors’ ambition to become
wealthy.276 Consistent with his view of just causes for war, Vitoria
273.
274.
275.
276.
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Id. at 37-39.
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believed that the only way the Spanish actions in the Andean region could
be justified was if indigenous people injured the Spaniards. Vitoria rejected the legality of the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire. However,
if it was just, Vitoria indicated that the Spanish conquerors should have
followed legal norms during war (ius in bello). Regarding this, he said:
[b]ut even supposing the justice in the war is all on the side of
the Spaniards, hostilities may not proceed beyond subduing
them and compelling them to accept the emperor as prince with
the infliction on them of as little damage and loss as possible.
This does not mean robbing them and leaving them destitute of
everything regarding their temporal goods.277
Vitoria believed that Spain’s military actions should have been proportionate to specific objectives. He believed that the actions of Francisco
Pizarro and other Spanish conquerors in the Andean region were violations of fundamental scholastic norms of natural law and the law of nations, including proportionality in the use of force.278
One of the greatest weaknesses of Anghie’s, Williams’, and other
authors’ criticisms of Vitoria’s international law doctrines, generally, and
the law of war particularly, is their complete disregard of the Spanish
conquest of the Inca Empire in the city of Cajamarca, a concrete historical
event. Considering that Vitoria specifically mentioned the event and rejected the legality of the Spanish war against the Incas, the lack of consideration of that fact does not allow one to see the possible universal and
just consequences of Vitoria’s international legal ideas in the 16th century
historical context. This does not mean that there were no other aspects of
Vitoria’s just war ideas which were ethnocentric and colonial. Ideas such
as the application of different standards for wars between European nations and between Spain and “infidel” nations.
Besides his focus on the Spanish conquest of the New World, Vitoria also wrote about the laws of war to address European wars with Muslim nations. However, it is not clear if all his doctrines applicable to Muslim nations were also applicable to the indigenous nations of the New
World. Even if this was the case, Vitoria did not believe that the Incas
violated the norms applicable to nations or the norms applicable only to
“pagan” nations.279 Therefore, for Vitoria, they did not commit injuries
which could have justified the Spanish use of force in the Incan realm.280
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Besides his ethnocentric doctrines on just war, Vitoria had ideas of
general universal application which respected indigenous interests, such
as the obligation of the winner of a war to administer his victory as an
impartial judge. Despite his biased doctrines on the ius in bello, Vitoria
believed that the actions of the Spanish conquerors in the Andean region
went beyond what was allowed in a just war.281
Despite the general consistency of Vitoria’s doctrines, there were
contradictions and inconsistencies which could be explained by his desire
to defend the interests of his country. These interests were often contrary
to his view of the universality of norms and the equality of human beings
created in God’s image (imago Dei). A biased just war doctrine, which
considered indigenous nations only as violators of the law, would not
have highlighted the Spanish violations of the law of war in the conquest
of the New World.
VIII. THE APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW IN THE INTERNAL
JURISDICTIONS OF INDIGENOUS POLITICAL COMMUNITIES
Previously it was held that Vitoria believed that the norms of travel,
trade, and evangelism were part of the natural law of nations which indigenous nations and Spain should have respected in their mutual relations. In this part of the article, the right to life, as a fundamental norm of
natural law, will be analyzed. Violations of that norm, such as human
sacrifice practiced by indigenous nations, was one of Vitoria’s most compelling justifications for the Spanish presence in the New World. Unlike
violations of the norms of the natural law of nations in the relations between nations, in this case the violations were against natural law in the
internal jurisdictions of indigenous political communities. Francisco de
Vitoria believed that indigenous people could not have been unaware of
fundamental norms of natural law, including respect for innocent human
life.282 Therefore, human sacrifice, even if justified by cultural reasons,
was a grave violation of natural law.283
Vitoria did not mention the customs of human sacrifice and cannibalism in the Inca Empire. However, he mentioned those practices in the
Aztec realm.284 For Vitoria, this was a just reason to use force and conquer
indigenous territories.285 He justified the Spanish conquest of the Aztec
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Empire because of grave violations of the right to life.286 He also mentioned alliances between minority indigenous groups and Spanish conquerors, in the Mesoamerican region, as a just reason to use force.287
One of Antony Anghie’s and Brett Bowden’s main arguments
against the justice of Vitoria’s ideas indicates that his objective was the
imposition of Spanish norms and cultural identity on the indigenous nations of the New World.288 Anghie believes that Vitoria’s normative ideas
were an imposition of Spanish norms not only for the regulation of relations between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New World, but
also for the regulation of the relations between indigenous sovereigns and
their citizens.289 Therefore, Vitoria tried to impose his European view of
natural law into the internal jurisdictions of indigenous political communities. For Anghie and other authors, Vitoria believed that indigenous
customs were against the Spanish version of the law of nations. Therefore, the Spanish cultural identity was the standard which indigenous nations had to embrace to become civilised.290
Antony Anghie indicates that in Vitoria’s writings there is a contradiction between the ontological indigenous person who could obey the
norms of natural law because of his rational capacity, and the concrete
cultural-historical indigenous person who constantly violated Spanish
norms.291 For him, Vitoria justified the Spanish use of force against indigenous nations because of the differences between Spanish and indigenous cultural practices.292 Anghie’s analysis can lead to the conclusion
that respect for indigenous customs and the sovereign will of the rulers
of indigenous nations were more important than stopping unjust violent
indigenous nations’ customs, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism.
Regarding the Spanish norms of natural law which applied not only
to the relations between nations, but also to the relations between indigenous people inside their political communities, Anghie writes:
. . . the Spanish acquire an extraordinarily powerful right of intervention and may act on behalf of the people seen as victims
of Indian rituals: ‘it is immaterial that all the Indians assent to
rules and sacrifices of this kind and do not wish the Spaniards
to champion them.’ Thus Spanish identity or, more broadly, an
286. ESCUELA DE SALAMANCA, supra note 42, at 36.
287. Muldoon, supra note 249, at 137.
288. Anghie, supra note 5, at 326-27.
289. Id. at 327.
290. See Brett Bowden, The Colonial Origins of International Law - European Expansion and
the Classical Standard of Civilization, 7 J. HIST. INT’L. 1, 12 (2005).
291. Anghie, supra note 5, at 22.
292. Id.
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idealized Western identity, is projected as universal in two different but connected dimensions of Vitoria’s system: Spanish
identity is both externalized, in that it acts as the basis for the
norms of jus gentium, and internalized in that it represents the
authentic identity of the Indian.293
The cultural practices and religious rituals, mentioned by Anghie,
were human sacrifice and cannibalism, which were part of the religious
customs of the Aztecs, Mayas, Incas, and other indigenous political communities. Robert Williams, Antony Anghie, and other authors do not pay
enough attention to Vitoria’s proposed norms that justify the use of force
to end violations of the right to life of innocent indigenous persons in
human sacrifice.294 It seems that for the 16th century Spanish historical
context, one of Vitoria’s most compelling and universal reasons to use
force against indigenous political communities was to save the lives of
innocent indigenous people.
For Vitoria, Spanish military actions which helped indigenous allies, who stood up against unjust laws and oppressive sovereigns, were
lawful. They were just because those actions were in defense of innocent
persons and against a tyrannical power. This was based on Vitoria’s view
of the unity of humankind and the authority of the entire world (autoritas
totius orbis) to prevent and punish grave violations of natural law. 295
Vitoria believed, in a just war, injured indigenous people could have
asked Spain to help them fight against dominant oppressive indigenous
sovereigns.296 Regarding this, he wrote, “[t]here can be no doubt that
fighting on behalf of allies and friends is a just cause of war . . . [a] commonwealth may call upon foreigners to punish its enemies and fight external malefactors.”297 Francisco de Vitoria specifically mentioned the
Spanish conquerors’ alliances with the Tlaxcala people.298 For a long
time, the Tlaxcaltecs fought against the Aztecs and tried to keep their
independence.299 The Aztecs continuously attacked them, and they resisted those actions. Often, the Aztecs used Tlaxcala prisoners of war in
human sacrifice.300 When Hernán Cortés arrived in their territory, they
resisted the Spanish conquerors.301 However, after several battles, the
293. Id. at 22-23.
294. For example, see WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 50, at 99. He does not consider Vitoria’s view
of the indigenous custom of human sacrifice.
295. See, e.g., MIRALLES, supra note 215, at 109.
296. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 289.
297. Id. at 289-90.
298. Id. at 289.
299. See HOWARD J. ERLICHMAN, CONQUEST, TRIBUTE AND TRADE 100 (2010).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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Spaniards won the war.302 The leader of the Tlaxcala people, Xicontencatl, offered peace to Cortés and asked him to become allies against the
Aztecs.303
After the Spanish conquerors were temporally defeated by the Aztecs, under the leadership of Cuitlahuac, and after the death of King Montezuma, they escaped to the territory of the Tlaxcala, where they reorganized and went back to Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital.304 Finally,
Cortés captured Cuauhtemoc, the new Aztec king, and defeated the Aztec
resistance.305
One of the few, Vitoria’s knowledge of concrete events in the relations between Spain and indigenous nations, was the Spanish alliances
with minority indigenous groups such as the Tlaxcaltecs. He considered
it a just reason to use force on behalf of indigenous minority groups who
were injured by other indigenous nations who ruled their territories.306
Regarding the Spanish protection of the Tlaxcaltecs against the Aztecs in
New Spain, Francisco de Vitoria wrote:
. . . whenever the barbarians themselves are engaged in legitimate war with one another, in which case the injured party has
the right to wage war, and may call upon the Spaniards to help
them, and then share the prizes of victory with them. This is
what is said to have happened when the Tlaxcaltecs were
fighting the Mexicans; they made a treaty with the Spaniards
that they should help them to defeat the Mexicans, and promised
them in return whatever they might win by the laws of war.
There can be no doubt that fighting on behalf of allies and
friends is a just cause of war . . . .307
A similar situation happened in the Spanish conquest of the Andean
region. Indigenous nations, who were enemies of the Incas, were the main
Spanish allies in the wars of conquest.308 Spain would not have been able
to conquer the Inca Empire if they did not establish strategic alliances
with indigenous nations that opposed the Incan rule in the Andean region.
Furthermore, the Incas were divided, which made it easier for the Spaniards to conquer them. At the end, the Spanish agreements with their
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Andean allies (Chancas, Cañarís, and other indigenous groups) were unfulfilled. 309
The norm of ‘defense of allies’ could have served as a justification
for the Spanish actions against the Incas. However, Vitoria did not mention this scenario regarding the Andean region. It seems that Vitoria believed that the doctrine of alliances, as a justification for the use of force,
was not applicable to the case of Francisco Pizarro’s actions in the Incan
realm.310
From the perspective of minority indigenous groups, such as the
Tlaxcaltecs or Chancas, it could have been considered just for the Spanish
conquerors to intervene on their behalf. In the 16th century historical context, it is difficult to know Vitoria’s motives to justify the Spanish use of
force to help minority indigenous nations. Did Vitoria propose this doctrine with the only objective of justifying the Spanish conquest, or was
he mainly concerned with the welfare of indigenous minority groups? He
may have had both objectives.
On one hand, it seems that he used ethical and legal norms to justify
Spain’s imperial expansion. On the other hand, it seems that he applied
what he considered to be just and universal norms to help indigenous
people who suffered oppression and persecution. Vitoria indicated that
the Romans used force for just motives, and at the same time, increased
their empire.311 This shows that Vitoria considered the use of force for
just motives to be consistent with Spain’s objective of conquering the
New World.
The norms of friendship and fellowship, as part of the social nature
of human beings, were one of Vitoria’s foundations to justify the use of
force in order to protect indigenous converts to Christianity and defend
indigenous allies.312 In the first case, converts to Christianity became
“brothers” and “sisters” of Spanish Christians because of their common
faith. In the second case, there was a political friendship.313 For Vitoria,
indigenous Christian converts should not have been persecuted because
of their religious beliefs.314 If they were persecuted, Spain could have
309. See, e.g., WALDEMAR ESPINOZA SORIANO, LA DESTRUCCIÓN DEL IMPERIO DE LOS INCAS
171-88 (4th ed. 1986).
310. Vitoria does not justify the Spanish conquest of the Inca realm. See ESCUELA DE
SALAMANCA, supra note 42, at 37-40.
311. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 289.
312. Id.
313. Ramón Hernández makes a distinction between natural and spiritual friendships in Vitoria’s international legal doctrines. See RAMÓN HERNÁNDEZ MARTIN, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA Y
SU ‘RELECION SOBRE LOS INDIOS:’ LOS DERECHOS DE LOS HOMBRES Y DE LOS PUEBLOS 112-15
(1998).
314. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 13-14.
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used force to protect their lives. For Vitoria, this was one of the main
reasons to use force against indigenous political communities. Regarding
this, he said:
. . . if any barbarians are converted to Christ and their princes try
to call them back to their idolatry by force or fear, the Spaniards
may on these grounds, if no other means are possible, wage war
on them and compel the barbarians to stop committing this
wrong. If they persist, they may exercise all the rights of war,
sometimes including the deposition of their masters, as in other
just wars. This third title may be advanced not only on grounds
of religion, but on grounds of human amity (amicitia) and partnership (societas) since the barbarians’ conversion to Christianity makes them friends and partners of us Christians . . . .315
Vitoria believed that one of the main reasons why Spain could use
force against tyrannical indigenous rulers was the ethical norm of loving
and respecting others.316 Also, he believed that because indigenous people, who were oppressed by their sovereigns, were part of the international community, they should be protected by Spain.317
IX. THE APPLICATION OF NATURAL LAW IN THE INTERNAL
JURISDICTIONS OF INDIGENOUS POLITICAL COMMUNITIES: THE RIGHT TO
LIFE AND HUMAN SACRIFICES
Francisco de Vitoria specifically mentioned the practice of human
sacrifice in Yucatan. This was the first place where the Spanish conquistador, Hernán Cortés arrived in the New World to begin the conquest of
the Aztec Empire.318 The practice of human sacrifice was widespread in
Mesoamerica and the Andean region.
It was not only the Mayas in Yucatan who practiced human sacrifice. The Aztecs, Incas, and other indigenous nations of the New World
also had religious beliefs which allowed these rituals. Aztec state ideology encouraged the human sacrifice of prisoners of war as offerings to
their gods.319 The Spanish ethno-historian, Bernardino de Sahagún, who
lived in New Spain from 1529 to 1590, described the human sacrifice

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288.
See, e.g., Solis et al., supra note 247, at 21.
See MIGUEL LEON-PORTILLA, AZTECAS-MEXICAS, DESARROLLO DE UNA CIVILIZACIÓN
ORIGINARIA 175-78 (2005) (describing the history of the Aztec civilization, including the practice
of human sacrifice).
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practiced by the Aztecs as part of their worship to their gods “Xipe Totec”
and “Huitzilopochtli.”320 Regarding this, Charles Phillips writes:
Another important central element of Mesoamerican civilization-at
least as far back as the Olmecs in c. 1200BC- was the use of human blood
sacrifice to honour and propitiate the gods. Among the Aztecs, vast lines
of prisoners of war were paraded up steep temple pyramids to be sacrificed by having their hearts ripped from their chests.321
One of the characteristics of the Inca religious worldview was the
offering of children in human sacrifice to the mountains which were considered gods. Unlike the Aztecs, the Incas believed in giving complete
human bodies in sacrifice without taking out any parts.322 For the Incas,
human sacrifice was a ritual to appease and obtain blessings from their
gods and show their power over other nations of the Andean civilization.
Regarding the Spanish accounts of the practice of human sacrifice in the
Andean region, Constanza Ceruti writes:
. . . [a]ccording to these accounts, sacrifices were made for different reasons, such as the important events in the life of the Inca
emperor, including his illness and death and the succession of a
new emperor to the throne…In regional contexts, they were
noted as often having been made to stop natural calamities, such
as droughts, epidemics and volcanic eruptions . . . .323
In the Andean region, ethnic groups such as the Mochica and the
Paracas also practiced human sacrifice. Regarding the custom of Inca
practice of human sacrifice, Nigel Davis writes:
[a] seemingly conservative figure comes from Fray Joseph de
Acosta, who states that when the Inca Huayna Capac died, only
a very few years before the Conquest, a thousand human offerings followed him to the next world. Acosta writes that when an
Inca ruler died, they killed his favourites and concubines, together with servants and court officials; children were also
slain.324
Although the indigenous nations’ practice of human sacrifice was
done inside their own jurisdictions, for Vitoria, foreign sovereigns, such

320. BERNARDINO DE SAHAGÚN, HISTORIA GENERAL DE LAS COSAS DE NUEVA ESPAÑA 97100 (Angel Maria Garibay ed., Editorial Porrúa 11th ed. 2006).
321. CHARLES PHILLIPS, THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE AZTEC & MAYA 1213 (Joy Wotton ed. 2009).
322. See Constanza Ceruti, Human Bodies as Objects of Dedication at the Inca Mountain
Shrines, (North-Western Argentina), 36 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 103, 113 (2004).
323. Id.
324. NIGEL DAVIES, HUMAN SACRIFICE IN HISTORY AND TODAY 261 (1981).
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as Spain, had authority to punish “evil” actions inside the jurisdictions of
other political communities when their own sovereigns did not do it.
For Vitoria, Christian and indigenous nations’ general violations of
natural law did not justify the use of force. Only the gravest violations of
natural law, such as the killing of innocent persons, justified the use of
force. Vitoria condemned the killing of innocent human beings by Spanish conquerors and indigenous people. Consistent with 16th century
Spanish Christian views of rationality, the norm of respect for the sanctity
of human life was considered of universal validity. Vitoria’s doctrine on
the protection of innocent human life was based on one of the norms of
the ten commandments of the Bible: “[y]ou should not kill.”325 Further,
Vitoria said: “ . . .this command was always the same before the law, during the time of the law, and in Gospel time. This is clear, because the
natural law is never changed; it is not abrogated, limited, or extended.”326
For Vitoria, there were some cases when the killing of human beings
was justified. Vitoria justified the killing of human beings in self-defense
against unjust attacks.327 However, he believed that violations of the right
to life of innocent human beings were never justified. For Vitoria, if Aztec rulers exercised their political authority consistent with natural law,
they should have stopped and punished the practice of human sacrifice.328
Because they did not do it, the nations who had the power to stop extreme
violent actions could justly use force to protect innocent human lives.
When innocent persons, such as children, were victims of human sacrifice, Spain could legitimately use force on behalf of the authority of the
international community.329
Regarding the norms of natural law which indigenous people were
supposed to obey, Professor Anghie said: “ . . . an idealised version of the
particular cultural practices of the Spanish assume the guise of universality as a result of appearing to derive from the sphere of natural law.”330
However, in the case of the defence of innocent human life, Vitoria’s arguments had a universal perspective. For the 16th century Spanish scholastic mindset, it was irrational to believe that a society, anywhere in the
world, could survive without respecting the right to life of innocent human beings.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

VITORIA, supra note 130, at 83.
Id.
Id. at 143.
See POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 214.
Id. at 288.
ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 21.
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Vitoria believed that the killing of human beings in religious rituals
and cannibalism was against natural law and divine law. 331 For Vitoria,
consistent with Felipe Castañeda’s analysis, people who practised cannibalism were murderers who constantly sought new victims to sustain their
habits.332 This created the conditions for constant wars between people
who practiced cannibalism. Therefore, they were constant violators of the
right to life.333 Vitoria also believed that cannibalism was against the right
to a burial because it destroyed the human body.334
Vitoria believed the killing of innocent human beings was against
divine law because it violated the Ten Commandments of the Bible.335
According to Vitoria, neither an innocent person nor a criminal could be
acceptable sacrifices to God.336 He believed all human life belonged to
God, who was the creator of life.337 Therefore, human beings could not
take away the life of innocent persons. He believed human sacrifice was
the result of indigenous nations’ idolatrous worldviews.338
For 16th century Spanish scholastic thinkers, indigenous nations
which committed evil actions, such as human sacrifice, violated fundamental doctrines of the Catholic Christian worldview regarding human
nature. Therefore, as Castañeda explains, for Vitoria, the person who
killed human beings for religious sacrifice and ate human flesh was the
ontological opposite of what a human being should be. 339 However, for
Antony Anghie, Spanish Christian norms could not have served to distinguish right from wrong. According to Anghie:
[t]he gap between the Indian and the Spaniard, a gap that Vitoria
describes primarily in cultural terms by detailed references to
the different social practices of the Spanish and the Indians, is
now internalized; the ideal, universal Indian possesses the
331. Vitoria addresses the issue of human sacrifice in his work De temperatia. For an excellent
analysis of De temperatia, see VICENTE BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, 2 ANUARIO DE LA ASOCIACIÓN
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 23, 41 (1931).
332. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECCIÓN SOBRE LA TEMPLANZA O DEL USO DE LAS
COMIDAS & FRAGMENTO SOBRE SI ES LÍCITO GUERREAR A LOS PUEBLOS QUE COMEN CARNES
HUMANAS O QUE UTILIZAN VÍCTIMAS HUMANAS EN LOS SACRIFICIOS 177, 178 (Felipe Castañeda
et al. ed., 2007).
333. Id.
334. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 210.
335. Id. at 214.
336. Id. at 215.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 216.
339. Felipe Castañeda, Antropofagia y Guerra Justa en el de Temperatia de Francisco de Vitoria, in RELECCION SOBRE LA TEMPLANZA O DEL USO DE LAS COMIDAS & FRAGMENTO SOBRE
SI ES LÍCITO GUERREAR A LOS PUEBLOS QUE COMEN CARNES HUMANAS O QUE UTILIZAN
VÍCTIMAS HUMANAS EN LOS SACRIFICIOS 159, 177 (Felipe Castañeda et al. ed., 2007).

FINAL_FOR_JCI

94

8/3/21 4:47 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 44:1

capacity of reason and therefore the potential to achieve perfection. This potential can only be realized, however, by the adoption or the imposition of the universally applicable practices of
the Spanish.340
For Vitoria, to end the custom of human sacrifice, it was necessary
to change indigenous nations’ worldviews on human nature and human
life. This means that the transformation of indigenous worldviews was
part of the process of implementation of the norms of natural law. If this
transformation meant the change of extreme violent practices of indigenous nations, which were contrary to their own interests, it could have
been consistent with 16th century views of universal justice. However, if
the change meant the destruction of fundamental aspects of indigenous
cultures and the imposition of Spanish interests, then this was a colonial
and ethnocentric excuse to conquer indigenous nations. For Vitoria, the
efforts to evangelise indigenous people were also efforts to end the ideological foundations of human sacrifice.341
Vitoria believed that indigenous nations’ worldviews justified the
killing of innocent human beings in human sacrifice.342 But this was not
the only characteristic of their norms and behaviour; he also recognized
that indigenous people had well-established political communities. Contrary to Vitoria’s perspective, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda labelled indigenous nations as savages and constant violators of natural law and rejected
the existence of political communities in indigenous territories.343 For
him, human sacrifice and cannibalism were evil actions which proved the
inherent ethnic inferiority of indigenous people and justified the Spanish
invasion and colonization of the New World.344
Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas had different views
about the justification for the use of force because of the human sacrifice
practised by indigenous nations.345 Bartolomé de las Casas justified human sacrifice done by indigenous nations because it was a “lesser evil.”346
For him, the Spanish wars against indigenous nations produced more evil
than the killing of innocent people in human sacrifice.347 He justified human sacrifice because for some indigenous nations it was a way of
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 327.
See VITORIA, supra note 332, at 178.
Id. at 160.
See GINÉS DE SEPÚLVEDA, supra note 14, at 109, 111-13.
Id. at 111-13.
See Teófilo Urdanoz, Las Casas y Francisco de Vitoria, 198 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS
POLÍTICOS, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 115 (Spain).
346. LEWIS HANKE, ALL MANKIND IS ONE 92 (Stafford Poole trans., 1994).
347. Id.
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demonstrating their love to God. The Aztec, Inca, Maya, and other indigenous nations gave their most precious persons, such as children, to their
gods in human sacrifice.348 De las Casas argued that it was very difficult
to change the religious worldviews of indigenous nations and their beliefs
in human sacrifice. Regarding this, he wrote:
[n]or is human sacrifice–even of the innocent, when it is done
for the welfare of the entire state–so contrary to natural reason
that it must be immediately detested as something contrary to
the dictates of nature . . . If they offend God by these sacrifices,
he alone will punish this sin of human sacrifice.349
De Las Casas’ commitment to a universal perspective, which respected the interests and cultures of indigenous people, included the forgiveness of human sacrifice and the rejection of the use of force to stop
them. Contrary to that view, Vitoria believed that, like all human beings,
indigenous people could violate fundamental norms of natural law. In the
case of human sacrifice, there was a clear violation of the right to life of
their own citizens. For him, this was not a violation of Spanish subjective
cultural standards, but a violation of a universal normative standard of
natural law.350
Consistent with his view on the importance of consistency between
positive law and natural law, Vitoria indicated that positive domestic laws
should punish human sacrifice. Regarding this, he said: “ . . . as St
Thomas so elegantly explains, the intention of law and legislators is to
make the subjects good . . . But they cannot be good if they live with bad
customs; therefore it is the prince’s duty to abolish these evil rituals.”351
For Vitoria, non-Christian sovereigns had authority to promulgate laws
against human sacrifice and punish its violations.352 Therefore, if an indigenous sovereign became a Christian, he had a higher obligation to enact laws against human sacrifice and ensure the end of this practice. Vitoria believed that Christian sovereigns could enact laws consistent not
only with natural law, but also with divine law and that their subjects,
Christians and non-Christians, were obliged to obey those laws.353

348. Id. at 93-95.
349. Id. at 94-95.
350. Authors critical of Vitoria’s views, such as David Kennedy and Antony Anghie, believe
that the international norms proposed by Francisco de Vitoria were culturally subjective opinions
imposed on indigenous nations. See, for instance, Anghie, supra note 5, at 321-22, and Kennedy,
supra note 138, at 23-35.
351. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 219.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 222.
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Christian princes could use force to stop human sacrifice practised by
foreign nations because it was a grave injury against innocent human beings.354
Vitoria believed that Christians could become rulers of indigenous
nations and had authority to force them to end unnatural rituals such as
human sacrifice.355 Vitoria believed that Christian rulers who governed
indigenous nations had to make good laws for the temporal wellbeing of
their subjects and consider the interests of indigenous nations.356 The implementation of good laws in the Spanish colonies was essential to preserve the good conscience of Spanish sovereigns.357 Regarding Vitoria’s
view of the place of justice in punishing human sacrifice, Scott Davis
writes “ . . . the perception of injustice formed by education in the virtues
makes it unthinkable to stand by while others are taken to be sacrificed.
This alone entitles the Spaniards to put an end to human sacrifice as an
institution.”358
X. THE USE OF FORCE: HUMAN SACRIFICES AND PROPORTIONALITY
Vitoria often quotes Saint Augustine, who justified the use of force
when a nation did not punish the “wrongdoings of its own citizens.”359
Because indigenous norms allowed human sacrifice, and indigenous sovereigns did not issue punishment for human sacrifice, Vitoria believed
that the use of force, based on the concept of the “good of the whole
world,” could have been properly applied to Spain’s wars against indigenous nations.360 Regarding this, he said:
I assert that in lawful defence of the innocent from unjust death,
even without the pope’s authority, the Spaniards may prohibit
the barbarians from practicing any nefarious custom or rite . . .
This applies not only to the actual moment when they are being
dragged to death; they may also force the barbarians to give up
such rites altogether.361
For Vitoria, grave violations of the right to life justified the conquest
of the Aztec Empire, as well as the actions of Spain in the Andean

354. Id. at 225.
355. Id. at 227.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 228.
358. G. Scott Davis, Conscience and Conquest: Francisco de Vitoria on Justice in the New
World, 13 MOD. THEOLOGY 4, at 475, 490 (1997).
359. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 298.
360. Id. at 225, 298.
361. Id. at 288.
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region.362 However, Vitoria did not mention the Inca practices of human
sacrifice.363 For Vitoria, the objective of Francisco Pizarro and other
Spanish conquerors in the Andean region was to exploit the natural resources of indigenous people, not to save innocent human lives.364
Francisco Suarez, like Vitoria, believed that wars should be waged
to defend innocent human beings only in extreme circumstances.365 According to him, “[T]his ground for war should rarely or never be approved, except in circumstances in which the slaughter of innocent people, and similar wrongs take place.”366 Consistent with the Spanish
scholastic understanding of natural law, human sacrifices practiced by
indigenous people were actions contrary to fundamental norms, such as
“love your neighbour as yourself” and “you should not kill innocent persons.”367 Regarding Francisco Suarez’s perspective on human sacrifice
and the use of force, Doyle writes: “Suarez added that this may be done
not only to liberate children, but also adults-even if they themselves consented and wished to be sacrificed to idols. For in this, he thought, these
adults were worse than madmen.”368
There were other Spanish scholastic thinkers besides Suarez who
agreed with and clarified Vitoria’s justification for the use of force
against indigenous nations to end human sacrifice. For Diego de Covarrubias, human sacrifice of innocent indigenous persons was a just reason
for war.369 According to him, the innocent people who could be killed in
human sacrifice were fellow human beings, and there was an assumption
that they were asking for help.370 Even if they did not ask for help directly,
there was still the Christian duty to save the lives of the innocent.371 For
Melchor Cano, indigenous nations and Spain could use force to protect
the lives of innocent human beings against homicidal policies.372
Juan de Solórzano indicated that the Incas practiced human sacrifice
to celebrate the appointment of a new king or when their king died.373
362.
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According to him, around one thousand children, from four to ten years
old, were sacrificed for those types of rituals.374 He also stated that the
wives of dead leaders were forced to be buried alive with their husbands.375 Solórzano believed that human sacrifice was “ . . . abominable
not only for us, who by God’s favour profess the pious Christian religion,
but also for the pagans and infidels . . . .”376 Solórzano also described the
Aztecs’ custom of human sacrifice.377 Solórzano concluded that Spanish
kings could wage wars against indigenous nations to force them to stop
human sacrifice and obey natural law.378 According to him, actions
against divine and natural law were actions against all humanity.379
Juan de la Peña—another Spanish scholastic thinker who interpreted
Vitoria’s doctrines—believed that even if it was consistent with their customs, it was still wrong for innocent indigenous persons to accept being
killed in human sacrifices.380 Peña focused on innocent persons because
he accepted human sacrifice of persons found guilty of crimes which deserved the death penalty. Peña concluded that the war against the Aztecs
was unjust because their human sacrifices were done against guilty human beings.381 According to him, the Spanish conquerors did not require
indigenous nations to stop the practice of human sacrifice before using
force. Also, the Spaniards killed more human beings in a few days than
the Aztecs did in many years of human sacrifice.382
For Vitoria, a just war to save the lives of innocent human beings
should have been proportionate to that narrow objective. According to
him, “if war is declared on the barbarians by this title, it is not lawful to
continue once the cause ceases, nor to seize their goods or their lands on
this pretext.”383 Vitoria did not mention when the causes for the killing of
innocent human beings by human sacrifice ended. If the main cause for
human sacrifice was the indigenous nations’ worldviews, which led them
to believe that it was good to kill innocent persons for religious reasons,
then changing this aspect of indigenous nations’ beliefs required a very
long time.384 In the case of the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire, the
374.
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use of force against the Incas was completely disproportionate to that specific religious objective. Regarding this, Vitoria opined:
I assume that, even if the war is fought by just title, the belligerent does not thereby have the power to eject the enemy from
their dominions (dominium) and despoil them of their property
at whim; he can act only as far as is necessary to ward off injustices (iniuriae) and secure safety for the future.385
If the Spanish conquerors had just titles to wage wars against indigenous people, they did not have the right, consistent with Vitoria, to occupy their territories. This part of Vitoria’s doctrine was not pro-colonial
because it defended the interests of indigenous nations. Regarding proportionality in the use of force, Juan de la Peña, who interpreted Vitoria’s
doctrines at the University of Salamanca, wrote: “Even when a war is
legal to defend innocent persons, the precept of prudence should be also
respected . . . [t]he war that is waged in defence of fellow human beings
should not result in more damage than the one as a result of [human]
sacrifice.”386
One of the leading thinkers in the Andean region in the 16th century
was José de Acosta. He agreed with the use of force to defend the life of
innocent persons in cases of human sacrifice if it was done in a proportional manner.387 Regarding this, he said:
it is also absurd to want to defend those if the defence will produce more mortality. And it is established by infinity of testimonies that many more, by far, have died in wars against the Indians than with any tyranny of the barbarians. What amount of
sacrifices and massacres of Indians did happen because of the
devastation caused by the sword of the Spaniards? Therefore,
morally speaking, it would be very difficult, or better to say that
it can never be alleged that the defence of innocents is a just
cause for war against the Indians.388
Vitoria’s doctrine on the use of force to end human sacrifice had a
great influence on the Spanish scholastic perspective of war. Vitoria’s
recognition of the principle of proportionality in the use of force to end
human sacrifice is a remarkable effort for the 16th century Spanish historical context. At that time, Spain’s main objective was to conquer and
385. POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 226.
386. DE BELLO CONTRA INSULANOS INTERVENCIÓN DE ESPAÑA EN AMERICA, supra note 69,
at 221.
387. JOSÉ DE ACOSTA, DE PROCURANDA INDORUM SALUTE, PACIFICACION Y COLONIZACION
292 (1984). .
388. Id. at 297.
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colonize indigenous nations without considering the consequences of the
use of force in the New World.
For Vitoria, Spain could use force against indigenous political communities to save innocent human lives or liberate indigenous nations who
were oppressed by another indigenous political community. Spain could
do this because oppressive indigenous commonwealths were not fulfilling the objectives for their existence, which included the protection of
the wellbeing of their citizens. In this case, the communitas orbis had the
authority to stop grave violations against innocent persons. Because of
this, a country with enough power, such as Spain, could use force on behalf of the entire world.
Considering that all human beings were part of the communitas orbis, the actions of Spain to save innocent human lives against the tyranny
of the Aztecs was based on the auctoritate totius orbis. The actions of
political communities taken on behalf of the rest of the world were considered legal even if oppressed indigenous people did not ask for help.389
The reason for this was that innocent human beings could not forsake
their right to life, which was given by God, who is the only one who could
take it away.
On the one hand, Vitoria’s justifications could be considered universal and just, consistent with 16th century views, because their aim was
to save innocent human beings who were oppressed and persecuted by
more powerful indigenous nations. On the other hand, under the excuse
of changing indigenous worldviews, which allowed the practice of human
sacrifice, and protecting Spanish allies, Spain could have justified the
conquest and colonization of indigenous nations.
Vitoria’s justification to use force to protect the lives of innocent
indigenous persons was consistent with 16th century Spanish views of
universal justice which recognized the sanctity of human life as one of its
main foundations. The objective of protecting innocent human lives could
not be considered ethnocentric or colonial because its aim was to protect
the wellbeing of innocent indigenous people, whose lives were at risk
because of the indigenous custom of human sacrifice. However, the Spanish disproportionate use of force was a problem that Vitoria did not systematically address. Therefore, even a principle, which could have been
considered universal and just, could also have had ethnocentric and unjust
consequences in its implementation.
Authors who are critical of Francisco de Vitoria’s ideas often do not
consider the complexity of Vitoria’s proposal of global normative
389. MIRALLES, supra note 215, at 109.
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standards that need to be understood in the intellectual Spanish 16th century context. In that context, ethical norms, such as respect for the sanctity
of human life, were an essential part of the prevalent worldview.
For Francisco de Vitoria, extreme violent actions against the sanctity of human life, even if committed consistently with domestic positive
indigenous laws, were against the natural normative order.390 For Vitoria,
indigenous nations, such as the Aztec, could not have rationally argued
that the systematic killing of innocent children in religious sacrifice was
part of their sovereign will. Sovereign wills could not have prevailed over
fundamental precepts of natural law such as respect for the right to life of
innocent human beings.
Although he does not specifically mention the indigenous practices
of human sacrifice and cannibalism, Antony Anghie indicates that Vitoria
not only tried to impose a Christian European understanding of norms for
the relations between nations on indigenous people, but he also tried to
force indigenous nations to follow those Spanish norms in their domestic
affairs.391 Following Anghie’s reasoning, it can be said that Vitoria’s justification to use force to stop human sacrifice and cannibalism was an
effort to impose norms contrary to indigenous cultures and justify Spain’s
colonial expansion. However, it is doubtful that Vitoria’s proposal to use
force to cease the practice of human sacrifice had the objective of justifying the Spanish colonial expansion in the New World. Considering Vitoria’s theological beliefs in the obligation to save innocent human lives,
he likely believed that Spain had a legal and moral obligation to stop the
practice of human sacrifice in the New World.
XI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrated that Francisco de Vitoria’s international
normative ideas were a 16th century effort to promote just global norms
which had ethnocentric pro-colonial components. Most of Vitoria’s proposed norms were a bona fide effort to transcend his cultural setting and
defend not only Spanish interests, but also the interests of indigenous nations and the international community.
Francisco de Vitoria’s international legal and political doctrines
emerged because of his interpretation of historical facts about the Spanish
conquest of indigenous nations. They also emerged because of his views
on the nature of indigenous nations and their political communities. He
390. Contrary to this view, David Kennedy wrote: “Vitoria organizes his doctrinal system in a
way which renders unjust and illegitimate what today would be termed exercises of sovereignty
which conflict with each other or the moral/legal order.” Kennedy, supra note 138, at 14-15.
391. See ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 327.
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interpreted those facts through the lenses of 16th century Spanish scholastic legal, theological, and philosophical concepts. In Vitoria’s historical setting, the conquest of the New World was justified by medieval law
doctrines of legal instruments such as the Requerimiento, Capitulations,
and Alexandrian Papal Bulls. Francisco de Vitoria rejected the doctrinal
foundations of these documents and proposed the application of natural
law in the international relations between Spain and the indigenous nations of the New World.
Francisco de Vitoria’s international normative ideas emerged in a
specific historical-intellectual context and answered specific questions
which were relevant for that time. Vitoria applied Thomas Aquinas’ scholastic ideas and canon law doctrines to the historical context of the Spanish conquest of the New World. In that context, there were emerging
views of universal justice such as the one of Bartolomé de las Casas, who
considered the interests of indigenous people even above the interests of
his own country. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda represented another view of
universal justice which identified Spanish national interests with the interests of humankind. Francisco de Vitoria’s international normative doctrines were closer to De las Casas’ universalism. However, it had some
elements consistent with Sepúlveda’s ethnocentric colonial views.
Vitoria recognized the source of civil power in the commonwealth
and not in ecclesiastical authority. Consistent with that belief, “infidel”
nations, such as the Inca, could have had legitimate political communities. Unlike medieval authors, who rejected the existence of political
communities in “infidel” nations because of their sinfulness and unbelief
in Christianity, Vitoria accepted the existence of dominion (dominium)
and civil power (potestate civili) in non-Christian nations. In his commentaries on Aquinas’ Summa theologiae, he recognized the internal sovereignty of indigenous nations by indicating that Christian sovereigns
were not superior to indigenous ones, and that their territories could not
be taken away.392 In his letter to Miguel Arcos, Vitoria equated the Inca
Empire with Castile and Aragon. Those political communities were part
of Spain, but they had a limited external sovereignty.393
Vitoria believed that indigenous nations, like all nations, were
obliged to obey the natural law of nations’ norms. These included the
norms of travel, trade, and evangelism. Violations of those norms by indigenous nations were considered injuries against the rights of Spanish

392. See VITORIA, supra note 82, at XXXIV.
393. See POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 301 & n.15; see also ESCUELA DE
SALAMANCA, supra note 42, at 36-39.
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visitors and immigrants in the New World.394 Those injuries were considered actions that justified the Spanish use of force as a just punishment.
For Francisco de Vitoria, grave violations of natural law norms inside
indigenous jurisdictions were considered offenses against God’s design
of the universe and contrary to God’s design of human nature. Human
sacrifice and cannibalism were grave violations of natural law norms.395
Therefore, for Vitoria, the Spanish conquest and colonization of the New
World could have been justified to stop and punish those practices.396 Despite Vitoria’s recognition of the importance of proportionality in the implementation of those norms, he did not properly address the use of those
natural law norms as an instrument to justify the conquest and colonization of indigenous political communities.397
This article showed that a careful analysis of Vitoria’s views on concrete facts regarding the Spanish conquest of the Inca and Aztec empires
reveals that Vitoria had a limited knowledge of the history and cultures
of indigenous nations. Because of this, he mentioned the practice of human sacrifice in the Aztec realm, but he did not acknowledge it in the
Inca Empire, where that was also common practice. He did the same regarding Spanish alliances with indigenous minority groups. Vitoria justified the use of force against the Aztecs because of the Spanish conquerors’ alliances with the Tlaxcaltecs. However, he did not mention the
Spanish alliances with indigenous nations in the case of the conquest of
the Inca Empire.
Among other reasons, Vitoria’s rejection of the legality of the conquest of the Inca Empire was based on his rejection of the doctrinal foundations of the Requerimiento, which was the main legal instrument to
justify the Spanish use of force in the Andean region. Contrary to this, he
justified the use of force against the Aztecs to end their customs of human
sacrifice and cannibalism. Those actions were not violations of the natural law of nations in the relations between Spain and indigenous nations.
They were violations of natural law by indigenous sovereigns against
their own people and in their internal jurisdictions. For Vitoria, Aztec
sovereigns violated fundamental norms of natural law because their customs allowed grave violations against the sanctity of human life. For the
Spanish 16th century mindset, the defense of innocent human life was
one of the most universal norms applicable to nations from diverse civilizations.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 284.
Id. at 207-14.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 283.
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Antony Anghie and other critical scholars disregard the fact that in
his letter to Miguel Arcos, Vitoria recognized that the Spanish conquerors’ actions in the Inca realm were illegal. He believed that the Inca people did not injure the Spaniards. Therefore, there was no justification to
use force in the Andean region. For Vitoria, the Inca—like all other indigenous nations—had the obligation to respect the natural law of nations’ norms of trade, travel, and evangelism. If they violated those
norms, they injured the Spanish immigrants and visitors in the New
World. However, Vitoria did not mention Inca violations of the natural
law of nations. Therefore, Francisco Pizarro’s war against the Inca Empire was illegal. For Vitoria, even if the Incas violated the natural law of
nations, Pizarro’s use of force was disproportionate, and he therefore violated the norms of the law of war in the battle of Cajamarca.398 The conquest of the Inca Empire could also have been justified because of grave
violations of natural law in the internal relations between the Inca sovereigns and their citizens. However, Vitoria did not mention the Inca practice of human sacrifice, either because he did not know about it or he did
not want to mention it.
If Francisco de Vitoria’s ideas are the starting point of international
law, there is not a colonial ethnocentric origin of this discipline. Despite
the contradictions and limitations of Vitoria’s international legal doctrines, his international legal ideas were a bona fide effort to promote just
international norms. This was done within the limits of Vitoria’s 16th
century Spanish intellectual-historical context and within his limited
knowledge about the indigenous nations of the New World.

398. Id. at 332.

